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## CHAPTER 6

# Political Parties in Chile: Stable Coalitions, Inert Democracy

*Alfredo Joignant*

### INTRODUCTION

In the 1997 parliamentary elections in Chile, the socialist candidate in the heavily populated District 20 of the metropolitan region obtained 12.5% of the votes without making the slightest campaign effort. This unusual situation was a result of his resignation as a candidate after the end of the candidate registration period, so his name still appeared on the ballot on Election Day. A unique case, apparently strange, but one that leads to the hypothesis of a profound electoral anchorage of political parties in Chile following the return to democracy in 1990 and the irresistible persistence of the monopoly held by two coalitions during elections.

This hypothesis is justified not only by the relative weight that a political party may have in a specific district, but also by the long history of political parties that sustain democracy in Chile, the persistence of political cultures reinforced by the characteristics of the electoral system, and the inertia of voters between 1989 and 2005.

This chapter will proceed historically. It will begin with the early history of stable parties, continue with the emergence of left-wing radicalism, discuss the collapse of democracy from 1973 to 1989, and finally come to the present era. The final section is devoted to testing this chapter's guiding hypothesis—inertial democracy—and discussing the burdens this tradition imposes on the further democratization of Chile.

### THE "CHILEAN EXCEPTION": THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE PARTIES

Authors who have taken an interest in Chilean political life have often emphasized the exceptional character of its democracy as compared to other Latin American countries, regardless of whether they are historians, sociologists, or political scientists. Thus Collier and Sater characterize Chile as having, from 1829 to 1994, a "background of political stability and institutional continuity over and above most Latin American and also some European countries like, for example, France."<sup>1</sup> Not totally different is the opinion of Foweraker, who affirms that Chile was "the only example of a multi party presidential system" to survive obstacle free for four decades and, hence, without a presidential majority in Congress.<sup>2</sup> Countless comparative studies echo this assessment of Chile's political history up until the coup d'état of 1973, seeing it as an "off the track case" in Latin America as far as democratic stability is concerned.<sup>3</sup> In all these studies, Chile regularly ranked first in democratic solidity, alongside Uruguay and Costa Rica.<sup>4</sup>

This democratic stability, which was in fact a case of political stability, can be traced to several causes. First is the electoral system. Chile was one of the first countries on the continent to encourage "the representation of minority parties or to maintain party competence, as well as access to the decision making process" through appropriate "electoral devices," a proportional representation system with an open list, using the D'Hondt distributive formula.<sup>5</sup>

A second explanation of the "advanced" nature of Chilean democracy lies in the early and gradual introduction of universal suffrage. The initial extension of suffrage took place in 1874 and involved an expansion of the electorate, free of all interruptions or ruptures, and was sustained by the 1890 electoral law.<sup>6</sup> It is this universalization process that Colomer presented in a formal model contrasting Chilean gradualism and the ruptures brought on by the marked expansion of suffrage in various Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Peru, and, to a lesser extent, Brazil.<sup>7</sup> This gradual universalization of suffrage in Chile helped to give electoral expression to the Radical Party (PR), whose origins are usually explained as being the result of clerical-anticlerical cleavage, which, in turn, served to gradually break the monopoly of political competition between liberals and conservatives. Thus the essential "voting choreography" existed long before the beginning of the 20th century, even in the context of elections still marked by fraud.<sup>8</sup> Such fraud has been seen as interacting "with the development of the electoral competition,"<sup>9</sup> serving a pedagogical learning function related to the act of voting.<sup>10</sup> This process remained incomplete until at least 1934, which was when women obtained the right to vote in municipal elections. It would find its maximum expression in

1970 with the establishment of the age of 18 years as the minimum voting age.

Many observers have found a third cause for Chile's early political stability in the nature of its cleavages, using the theoretical approach of Lipset and Rokkan.<sup>11</sup> This approach allows for the identification of two great social fissures, both at the point of origin of specific parties and at the ever more complex point of political competition they confronted. On the one hand, the aforementioned clerical-anticlerical cleavage brought about the birth of new political forces (the PR) along with a predominance of conflicts surrounding civil and political rights, which, in turn, became sufficiently powerful to create a conflict between liberals and conservatives. It is in the context of this cleavage that the first conflicts surrounding the extension of suffrage and its democratization take place and where the intervention of the conservative governments in election processes by means of its electoral agents and the subsequent fraud come to be seen as veritable leitmotifs in the elections of those times.

Nevertheless, thanks to the capitalist development of Chile that came as a result of the saltpeter boom in the last quarter of the 20th century, Chilean workers began to organize, especially in the northern part of the country, and to do so initially in anarchist form. These first forms of working organization were a subdued expression of the increasing influence exercised by a new cleavage (industrialist worker vs. employer) but led to the formation of the Democratic Party (1887), later the Socialist Working Party (1911), two precursory parties preceding the Communist Party (PC, founded in 1921) and, years later, the Socialist Party (PS, in 1933).

Thus the Chilean party system was formed on the basis of two great cleavages that coexisted for the better part of the period running between 1870 and 1952. These cleavages permitted the creation of the right-left axis, which in turn organized the political space in relation to the issues inscribed in both. However, more important still was that Chile was thus able to establish early on a party system, more like that of its European counterparts, especially France, than those of its Latin American neighbors.<sup>12</sup> As in Europe, the Chilean system was organized around cleavages and a left-right axis, whereas parties in neighboring states—especially in Argentina—were far more feeble and organized around strong but localized individual leaders (caudillos). As indicated by Roberts and Wibbels, "only in Chile did the party system develop the foundation of classes along with an ideological continuum that brought it closer to the systems in operation in western Europe."<sup>13</sup>

Thus it is along the perimeter defined by these two cleavages that conservative, liberal, radical, communist, and socialist parties took their place, whose lasting electoral presence up until 1952 became a real barrier, preventing the entrance of new political forces. It is only in the

framework of the democratic breakdowns of 1927 led by Colonel Carlos Ibáñez, which gave way to the first Chilean military dictatorship of the 20th century (1927–1931), that the electoral monopoly held by these first four parties (PR, PC, Conservative, and Liberal parties) came under serious challenge. After that, the political struggle once again focused on these same four parties, with the addition of the PS in 1933.

Not even the experience of the Popular Front (1938–1941), a government alliance involving socialists, radicals, and communists, was able to eliminate some of these parties while strengthening others. After the failure of this first form of center–left government came a period of electoral hegemony by the PR based on a “pendulum center” strategy that allowed for an oscillation to both the left and the right.

The second great challenge to the dominance of the dominant party labels was the electoral earthquake of 1952, which brought to power Carlos Ibáñez, the same dictator of 20 years earlier now anointed as a democratically elected president. Although Ibáñez was victorious in 1952 on the strength of a speech generally labeled as “populist,” in that it sought to sweep aside the monopoly of the parties by appealing to the personal and extrainstitutional virtues of its leadership, his movement never managed to organize itself into a bloc with regular and relevant electoral success.<sup>14</sup> In this regard, Jean Gruegel is right in observing that Ibáñez’s failure was due to the seemingly irresistible continuity of the same old parties, determined to recover their monopoly of the electoral game and justify their doing so as “a reactive movement” in the face of a “political system crisis” created by the merging of two antinomic principles (the socialist and neo-fascist) in a single movement of the “people.”<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, just as the fall of the first Ibáñez government was marked by the appearance of the PS, the failure of his second attempt 20 years later coincided with the birth of a new party in 1958, the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), also destined to endure.

#### THE SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORIGINS OF LEFT-WING RADICALISM

Despite the apparent stability of Chilean parties and the consolidation of the left with the birth of the Communist Party in the 1920s and the birth of the PS in 1933, profound mutations in Chilean political life took place toward the end of the 1950s, especially on the left. The development of the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution of 1959 had a radicalizing effect on all political forces.<sup>16</sup> What were these effects and how did they affect both the individual parties and the entire political field? How did the electorate react? Can we see in this rampant radicalization the early origins of the coup d’état of 1973 and the resultant downfall of democracy? How can we explain the astonishing survival

of so many of the Chilean political parties throughout a dictatorship that lasted 17 years? It is to these questions that we now turn.

Our approach will be to concentrate on the political impact in Chile of the socioeconomic factors that served as catalysts of the Cold War and Cuban Revolution. This is contrary to most scholarship, which has attempted to explain the relationship between parties and democracy in Chile by emphasizing first and foremost their ideologies and internal struggles (generally stressing the parties of the left and the PDC).<sup>17</sup>

Although a few studies have tackled the subject of the stability of the liberal, conservative, radical, socialist, and communist party electorate, most have focused instead on the phenomenon of the radicalization of left-wing parties and voters, especially once the enormous political impact caused by the Cuban Revolution became apparent.<sup>18</sup> This focus, especially apparent in North American studies, provided an empirical vision of the change in course, stressing the vertical and horizontal electoral penetration of the party system in Chile during 1963–1969 and showing the strong resemblance among forms of partisan competition at the national and local levels.<sup>19</sup> Such a finding suggests that there was a common mode of diffusion of political struggles and partisan actors.

But did this territorial penetration by the parties really mean that the radicalization of the actors followed the same pattern as that of the electorate? If so, then the relationship among political parties, the radical behavior of voters, and democratic stability need to be investigated.

The first systematic work on this problem was by Soares and Hamblin who, on the basis of census information, brought to light a “multiplying effect” of variables such as class polarization, industrialization, anomie, urbanization, and relative economic deprivation when accounting for the voting patterns of the “radical left” at the 1952 elections.<sup>20</sup> Alejandro Portes then detected an “absence of effects” in objective variables without the mediation of subjective factors in voting or in the expression of left-wing party affection in 1961, as part of a survey of heads of home in Santiago.<sup>21</sup> In both studies, however, the radicalization of the left-wing electorate was not easily explained, and no conclusive proof was offered of a generalized radicalization of the electorate or of the most disfavored social groups. It remained to be seen that there were regular voting patterns among this electorate, for example, in favor of the “reformist” presidential candidates advocating change (Ibáñez in 1952 and Allende in 1958). In 1970, Sandra Powell carried out an analysis by areas, allowing her to conclude that all Chilean parties became highly “aggregative” between 1952 and 1964 as a result of “much less stratified social bases.”<sup>22</sup> This meant that electorates had become increasingly heterogeneous, but not that they were equally radicalized.

The hypothesis of a growing radicalization was largely accepted by the political actors as well as by most observers, especially in the

United States. This was, after all, the era in which the U.S. administration was promoting the Alliance for Progress (begun in 1961) in Latin America, and it was part of this program to seek to convince others that the countries of the developing world were now veering off into revolutionary or "subversive" paths and should therefore be integrated into the Alliance.<sup>23</sup> The hypothesis of menace required asserting that there was a serious risk that the entire population would be radicalized unless intervention addressing the social and economic causes of this phenomenon took place.

However, the proof of such radicalization was never provided. Where radicalization was widespread, as in the four settlements on the periphery of Santiago studied by Portes, the reason appeared to lie in the strength of socialization patterns from "father to son." Petras and Zeitlin found that organized workers were taking "new ideas of struggle and class solidarity to friends and relatives still living out in the countryside and working in agriculture," a finding that ignored the local politicization work undertaken by the PS and PC or the unionization of agricultural workers encouraged by Frei Montalva Christian Democrat government (1964–1970) but did introduce political aspects into the dissemination of left-wing radicalism.<sup>24</sup> In sum, it was becoming clear that radicalization was the result of profound economic and social inequalities that served as the material basis for the work of mobilization undertaken by the parties on the left as they campaigned against the established order and a "formal and bourgeois democracy."

However, these inequalities received scant attention in the explanations offered for the radicalization of left-wing parties and their electorates. Instead, the tendency was to move directly to the notion of "polarization," developed by Giovanni Sartori<sup>25</sup> and used by him to explain the democratic collapse in Chile in 1973 as based on the polarized and highly ideologized characteristics of party competition in the context of an atomized party system, as well as the study by Linz and Stepan,<sup>26</sup> who conceive this as a set of opportunities and obstacles for actions to be taken by the main players. Although the interest of these two works is incontestable, it is important to note that such explanations hide the role played by poverty, inequalities, and underdevelopment as factors weakening the cognitive and affective foundations of Chilean democracy and opening the way for the left-wing workers' parties to propose radical projects largely inspired by the Cuban Revolution. From the presidential triumph of Frei Montalva in 1964 to the fall of the Popular Unity government led by Salvador Allende (1970–1973), the party system absorbed the impact of increasing polarization in Chilean society, if we take this to mean a growing ideological distance between the conflicting forces, the proliferation of strikes, and an elevation in the levels of political violence—all aspects systematically tackled by Valenzuela.<sup>27</sup> These aspects, along with the phenomena

of "hypermobilization" (an explosive rise in union membership, high indexes of mobilization beyond union and party control, expressed through a considerable increase in illegal strikes),<sup>28</sup> would end up becoming the most widely accepted explanation for the radicalization not only of the left but of all political forces and, hence, for the 1973 democratic collapse.<sup>29</sup> That all of this stemmed first and foremost from actual socioeconomic conditions was by and large ignored.

### DEMOCRATIC COLLAPSE AND THE REACTIVATION OF OLD PARTY LABELS

Various interpretations have been given to the coup d'état of 1973. For some authors, the democratic collapse brought to a brutal conclusion the unprecedented revolutionary process achieved via electoral channels and led by a left-wing party coalition (Popular Unity) forged on the basis of the Socialist Party–Communist Party axis, with the addition of various other less important forces. For such authors, the coup was in keeping with the counterrevolutionary logic.<sup>30</sup> Other authors, however, viewed the collapse of democracy as a result of the very centrifugal dynamics created by an atomized party system, forces that were encouraged by a situation of supposedly observable polarization both in the political field and in the highly varied interactions of everyday life.<sup>31</sup> As such, the coup d'état represented a solution to a situation of crisis. For yet others, armed intervention was basically aimed at disarticulating the "classic sociopolitical matrix" on which Chilean democracy rested, that is, the regular patterns of interaction between state, party system, and social base.<sup>32</sup>

Regardless of the interpretation adopted in the long run, the relevant point is that the democratic collapse took the form of violent repression against left-wing parties in the framework of a general "recess" from parliamentary and party life decreed by the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. The repression was so extreme as to constitute, according to Steve Stern, the "policide" project against the original Popular Unity forces, a systematic strategy "of destruction of modalities relating to how politics and governance were to be exercised and understood" in an effort to substitute them for "technocratic and authoritarian" forms of government.<sup>33</sup>

Indeed, one of the characteristics of the military dictatorship (1973–1990) involved a deliberate absence of party expressions close to the regime. Still more, this absence of pro-regime parties was achieved with the approval of the right-wing parties under the umbrella of the National Party (PN, founded in 1965 as a result of a fusion between liberals and conservatives, in "recess" since 1973), and of the gremialismo movement that began to sprout in the Catholic University and that was set to become the Independent Democrat Union (UDI) Party at the end

of the 1980s.<sup>34</sup> It is thus possible to maintain that the military dictatorship was the type of regime that encouraged technocratic forms of government and was characterized by an anticommunist ideology plainly hostile to party and parliamentary routines.

However, the scope of this "policide" project did not prevent the same party labels from reappearing at the end of the Pinochet regime. Unfortunately, we know little of the work done to preserve the old parties, especially the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, both of which suffered the disappearance of whole generations of leaders and militants by means of forced disappearance, prison, and exile. Nor do we know exactly how Christian Democrat militantism and the old conservative elites were preserved under a regime of party "recess."<sup>35</sup> This in itself is an area worthy of further exploration.

Regardless, it is important to mention that the reactivation of the parties when facing the 1989 legislative elections as a result of the defeat of Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite was not simply a mechanical reflection of a sudden awakening of labels, since the ever more explicit existence of the opposing parties, especially the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the Christian Democrat Party, was already observable in the press and various social fields throughout the 1980s.

#### FROM TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY TO INERTIAL DEMOCRACY

With the return to democracy on March 11, 1990, Chile again became the object of exceptional judgments, in this case with respect to "the supposedly exemplary" nature of its transition. Such an opinion was based on different types of arguments, either specific or totally local ones (as Munck stated in 1994, "the first transfer of power between leaders of the same party" after almost 50 years<sup>36</sup>), or founded on general evaluations referring to the unique success of an agreed transition not implying the immediate political disappearance of the ex-dictator,<sup>37</sup> although we should not overlook the fact that these judgments generated a great deal of controversy.<sup>38</sup>

However, the most reasonable explanation for the success of the transition is that the resurgence of the old political parties and the appearance of new forces were based on an agreement between elites of the opposition and Concertación.<sup>39</sup> This latter coalition of center-left political parties, in power since 1990 and comprised of the PS, PDC, PRSD, and the Partido por la Democracia (PPD),<sup>40</sup> won all the elections up until 2005 (Table 6.1), running against a right-wing opposition coalition (known today as Alianza por Chile), which comprises Renovación Nacional National Renewal (RN) and UDI (Unión Demócrata Independiente).<sup>41</sup> The hypothesis to be explored in this section is that following the return to democracy in 1990, the Concertación knew how to maintain voter

apathy and maintain itself in power.<sup>42</sup> As we shall see, there are powerful electoral and institutional reasons to explain the reproduction of the dominant political parties and alliances and thereby the creation of an "inertial democracy" based on the continuous success of the same coalition.

#### Institutions Shaping Chilean Politics Today

Chilean democracy is based on a presidential regime, typical in Latin America. Under the constitution of 1980, inherited from a dictatorship and still in place despite numerous reforms reinforcing the powers of the president, executive power is directed by the president, elected for four years without the possibility of immediate reelection. Facing him is a bicameral legislature composed of a Senate whose 38 members are elected for eight years and indefinitely renewable, within binomial circumscriptions, and a Chamber of Deputies whose 120 members are elected for four years, also for renewable terms and also in binominal districts.

Voting in Chile is compulsory once citizens have registered in the electoral registers to vote in three types of elections: presidential, legislative, and municipal. Between 1925 and 1970, the Chilean presidential elections did not allow for a second round, which meant that if no candidate obtained the absolute majority of the votes in the only electoral round, it was up to Congress to choose the president from the first majorities. From 1989 to the present, a second round between the first two relative majorities became possible. Regarding the duration of the

Table 6.1 Elections in Chile, 1989–2005

Year	Type of election
1989 (December)	Presidential election
1989 (December)	Legislative elections (concurrent)
1992 (October)	Local elections
1993 (December)	Presidential election
1993 (December)	Legislative elections (concurrent)
1996 (October)	Municipal election
1997 (December)	Legislative elections (not concurrent)
1999 (December)	Presidential election (1st round)
2000 (January)	Presidential election (2nd round)
2000 (October)	Local elections
2001 (December)	Legislative elections (not concurrent)
2004 (October)	Local elections (major election)
2004 (October)	Local elections (councilors election)
2005 (December)	Presidential election (1st round)
2005 (December)	Legislative elections (concurrent)
2006 (January)	Presidential election (2nd round)

presidential mandate, it has been characterized by inconsistency since 1989: four years (1990–1994), six years (1994–2000 and 2000–2006), and finally fixed at four years from 2006 on.

When the presidential mandate lasted four years, the presidential elections were concurrent with the legislative elections, which was not the case on two occasions (in 1997 and 2001). The legislative elections consist of elections for senators (38) and deputies (120), the former elected for eight years and the latter for four years, in circumscriptions and districts of identical magnitude in which two seats are always in play (a situation found only in Chile), in a single round, with an open-list system (the voter chooses a single candidate whether that person belongs to a party or is independent). Given the duration of the mandate of the senators, these are renewed in halves every four years.<sup>43</sup> The electoral system is based on proportional representation, with a D'Hondt method of conversion of votes into seats, which explains why in order for a party or a coalition of parties to obtain both seats in dispute they must double the votes of the force that follows it.


Finally, the municipal elections evolved between 1992 and 2000 on the basis of voting for council representatives (whose number varies as a function of the population size of the municipalities, that is with magnitudes of 6, 8, or 10) with an open-list system, also governed by a D'Hondt system, such that the council candidate who has reached the first majority with at least 35% of the votes is elected mayor (in a default, the mayor is elected by the municipal council of its members). From 2004 to the present, the election of mayors has been separate from the election of the council.

### Electoral Results

In this electoral scene widely dominated by the Concertación and the Alianza por Chile, the PC competes together with other small leftist forces without success in obtaining seats in legislative elections, but has some success at the lower levels. The "extraparliamentary left" (Figure 6.1) obtains an average 6.36% in legislative elections, but does slightly better in municipal elections (6.58%), and given the greater magnitude of the municipal districts, it is able to attain a certain number of council seats.<sup>44</sup> Figure 6.1 shows the electoral representation of the three main coalitions in legislative (deputies, five elections) and municipal (council, four elections) elections, from 1989 to 2005, as a percentage of the valid national votes cast.


In Figure 6.2, the electoral weight of the four historical parties (PS, PC, PDC, and PRSD) is contrasted with the total for the national vote (first bar on the left), the vote for the Concertación (second bar to the right),<sup>45</sup> and continues with the total vote for the Concertación (third bar) and for the Alianza (fourth bar).

Figure 6.1. Electoral Results of Three Main Coalitions in Legislative Elections (Deputies, Five Elections) and Local Elections (Councillors, Four Elections), 1989–2005 (in percentage of the national valid votes).



Source: Servicio Electoral (www.elecciones.gov.cl).

Figure 6.2. Relative Electoral Weight of Four Historical Parties (SP, CDP, CP, and Radical Social Democrat Party), 1989–2005.



Source: Servicio Electoral (www.elecciones.gov.cl).

As can be seen, the average vote for the more established parties was 39.7% in legislative elections and 44.87% in municipal elections.<sup>46</sup> In this sense, the relative strength of these parties is superior to that of its adversaries of the right in legislative elections (between two and four

Table 6.2 Electoral Results of the Parties That Competed Regularly in Legislative Elections, 1989–2005<sup>1</sup>

	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005
CDP (votes)	1,766,347	1,827,373	1,331,745	1,162,210	1,370,501
CDP (%)	25.99	27.12	22.98	18.92	20.76
CDP (seats)	38	37	38	23	20
SP (votes)	n.a.	803,719	640,397	614,434	663,561
SP (%)	n.a.	11.93	11.05	10.00	10.05
SP (seats)	n.a.	15	11	10	15
PPD (votes)	778,501	798,206	727,293	782,333	1,017,956
PPD (%)	11.45	11.84	12.55	12.73	15.42
PPD (seats)	16	15	16	20	21
Radical Social Democrat Party (votes)	268,103	200,837	181,538	248,821	233,564
Radical Social Democrat Party (%)	3.94	2.98	3.13	4.05	3.54
Radical Social Democrat Party (seats)	5	2	4	6	7
National Renewal (votes)	1,242,432	1,098,852	971,903	845,865	932,422
National Renewal (%)	18.28	16.31	16.77	13.77	14.12
National Renewal (seats)	29	29	23	18	19
Independent Democrat Union (votes)	667,369	816,104	837,736	1,547,209	1,475,901
Independent Democrat Union (%)	9.82	12.11	14.45	25.18	22.36
Independent Democrat Union (seats)	11	15	17	31	33
CP (votes)	n.a.	336,034	398,588	320,688	339,547
CP (%)	n.a.	4.99	6.88	5.22	5.14
CP (seats)	No competition	0	0	0	0
Humanist Party (votes)	52,225	67,733	168,597	69,692	102,842
Humanist Party (%)	0.77	1.01	2.91	1.13	1.56
Humanist Party (seats)	0	0	0	0	0

Notes: n.a., not applicable when party did not compete. Percentage of votes and number of seats in each election do not add up to 100% (120 seats), because the table does not include independent candidates and parties that did not compete in all elections.

<sup>1</sup>No results either for independents or in coalition.

Source: Official electoral data available in [www.servel.cl](http://www.servel.cl).

percentage points), and substantially greater in municipal elections (where the Alianza por Chile obtains an average 34.97%, almost 10 percentage points difference). As Table 6.2 shows, the electoral weight of the PS, PDC, and PRSD in the Concertación decreased in municipal elections from 79% in 1992 to 74% in 2004, a pattern that is accentuated in legislative elections (75% in 1993 and 66% in 2005), but compensated for by the increasing electoral success of the PPD after the decline of the PDC.

Obviously these numbers are far from constituting conclusive evidence regarding votes on the basis of party loyalties (for example, interpreting the declining electoral impact of traditional parties on the electorate of the Concertación and on the total votes would be a weak test for party identifications). In effect, a certain presumption of adhesion exists, in this case through survey data, for coalition candidates independently of the parties to which they belong, although this does not necessarily conclusively establish the existence of a coalition electorate, inasmuch as a weakening of the measurements is also observed.<sup>47</sup> Without trying to settle the issue about the extent of the loyalties involved, the true research problem is whether the permanence of these parties, and with them the predominance of the two main coalitions, is explained because of continuity with the old cleavages, or if these divisions have in fact been displaced by new ones.

In this regard, a certain controversy has arisen regarding the continuity (or discontinuity) of the party system, politically relevant because of the party strategies involved, depending on who is right. For Valenzuela and Scully, the party system is essentially the same as that which existed until 1973.<sup>48</sup> This, they argue, is not only due to the evident formal continuity of four of the eight parties that regularly compete in legislative elections (PS, PDC, PRSD, and PC), but is determined as well by the supposed continued effectiveness of the same cleavages from which they originated, reflected in important correlations between "the electoral results" at commune level "of 1988 and 1989, and those of 1969, 1970, and 1973," on the one hand for the left, and on the other for the PDC.<sup>49</sup> Valenzuela tried in addition to verify the accepted thesis in Chile of the three electoral thirds, according to which the electorate has been historically divided, following the logic of the right-center-left axis into relatively equal proportions, which he argues still holds today, although in an imperfect way (the left being the smallest third).<sup>50</sup>

Very different are the positions of Tironi and Agüero and Torcal and Mainwaring, who argue for an essential discontinuity of the party system within the framework of the appearance of a new cleavage: dictatorship/democracy.<sup>51</sup> In the center of this scholarly controversy are very different conceptions of the genesis of the cleavages. While for Valenzuela a sociological conception of cleavages according to the theory of Lipset and Rokkan<sup>52</sup> prevails, others are ready to revise that

theory and assume that political action itself can generate cleavages sufficiently powerful to reorganize the party system in new terms.<sup>53</sup> If they are right, the Concertación has a better chance of enduring as a coalition formed against dictatorship. But if the old cleavages are being revived, the political struggle will once again turn around the questions of social and economic inequalities. It is not possible to prove or disprove either interpretation today, but clearly the question of which one is correct will have important consequences for Chilean political life.

A scholarly consensus does exist regarding the remarkable continuity of the electoral predominance of the two main coalitions. As Table 6.3 shows, the electoral monopoly of these two coalitions has oscillated between 85% and 92% of the valid votes, with these votes producing a minimum of 116 to a maximum of 120 seats, which in 1993 constituted the totality of the Lower House.

This monopolistic representation of the electorate is even more spectacular when assessing the volatility of the electorate by means of the Pedersen index, both at coalition and party levels (Figure 6.3).<sup>54</sup>


If the data contained in DataGob already placed Chile at low levels of electoral volatility in 2001 at coalition level (8.85 versus 28.32 for America and the Caribbean), this figure drops significantly in 2005, according to my calculations, when it reached 6.04.<sup>55</sup> Although the number of elections is not very big, this volatility index at the coalition level increases when the elections are not concurrent (8.01 in 1997–2001) dropping by one or two points in concurrent elections (7.49 in 1989–1993 and 6.04 in 2001–2005). If one repeats the same exercise at party level, with the exception that the construction of the volatility index covers in this case only the legislative elections held since 1993,<sup>56</sup> favoring the tickets that competed continuously in these elections, the volatility index is fixed at 4.91 in 2005. Also a considerable increase in this index between nonconcurrent elections is observed here (11.08 in 1997–2001), dropping by more than six percentage points when the elections are concurrent (4.91 in 2001–2005).

Caution must be exercised when interpreting this last index. The nature of the binomial electoral system requires the two principal coalitions to present lists with two candidates, and only two candidates, in all the districts where only two seats are being contested. For Alianza

Table 6.3 Electoral Concentration (Votes and Seats) of the Two Main Coalitions in Legislative Elections, 1989–2005

	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005
Votes of Concertación and Alianza por Chile (%)	85.67	92.08	86.77	92.17	90.58
Number of seats of Concertación and Alianza por Chile (total seats: 120)	117	120	116	119	119

Figure 6.3. Pedersen Electoral Volatility Index in Legislative Elections, by Coalitions and Parties, 1993–2005.




por Chile, this does not present a serious difficulty, given that it is comprised of two parties: candidate lists are thus formed by one member from each party or else by independents supported by one of the two parties. On the other hand, the law poses numerous problems for the Concertación, which consists of four parties. The negotiations required to determine which two parties will have candidates in each circumscription are extremely difficult, and a single party is never able to present candidates in all the districts. This leads necessarily to a reduction in the number of parties as the four parties cannot have as many candidates as those of the Alliance, and also to the common conclusion that there is a low number of effective electoral parties in Chile—generally between a little more than two and something less than four—based on the Laakso and Taagepera index.<sup>57</sup> But this evaluation is made under the problematic assumption that the two coalitions are parties, or behave as such, which naturally results in the low indices of electoral volatility. In any case, both indices indicate a very low electoral volatility, which already constitutes the beginning of an explanation for the monopoly from which the two dominant coalitions benefit.

## EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTORATE

To understand this monopoly, it is helpful to consider descriptive elements of the electorate as a whole and its behavior. The first thing to observe (Figure 6.4) is the ever more dissimilar evolution of the voting age population (VAP) and of the electorate enrolled in the electoral registers. The evolution of both populations remained relatively stable until 1993; since then the gap between them has not stopped widening,



Figure 6.4. Evolution of the Voting Age Population (VAP) and Registered Voters, Legislative Elections, 1989–2005 (in millions).



Note: For 1989, the VAP data corresponds to 1990.

Source: VAP, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas ([www.ine.cl](http://www.ine.cl)) and registered voters, Servicio Electoral ([www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl)).

reflecting an enrolled electorate practically frozen at around 8 million voters. If in 2005 the electorate increased 8.06% with respect to 1989 (even with a slight reduction in 1997), the VAP increased 24.93%, so the breach between the enrolled electorate and the VAP has increased regularly, to the point that in 2005 those registered represented only 72.60% of the VAP.<sup>58</sup> This then means that the population for which competition takes place in the Chilean elections from 1989 is approximately the same, which suggests that the coalitions and the parties adjust their slate of candidates and their campaign strategies to the characteristics of an ever older electorate (the same who voted for the plebiscite in 1988 against or for Pinochet), and to the new cleavage democracy/dictatorship. In fact, the votes for the two coalitions have varied between 85% and 92% in five legislative elections, independently of the widening gap between the VAP and the registered electorate. This means mainly that the Concertación and the Alianza por Chile are farther from being majority coalitions in relation to the VAP, especially if one considers that the electoral disaffection index has more than doubled in 16 years, going from 22.53% in 1989 to 57.42% in 2005 (Table 6.4). In this sense, the considerable stability of the valid votes and the low rates of null and blank votes observed (except in 1997 for the three cases) give rise to a true “buffer” of electoral security in favor of both coalitions. There follows from the above a bicoalitional predominance founded on the disaffection of a great contingent of potential

Table 6.4 Electoral Disaffection: Evolution of Registered Voters by Valid Votes, Blank Votes, Null Votes, and Abstentions Relative to Voting Age Population (VAP) in Legislative Elections, 1989–2005

	1989	1997	2001	2005
VAP <sup>1</sup>				
Registered voters	8,499,972	9,782,590	10,506,435	11,322,769
Registered voters (%/VAP)	7,557,537	8,069,624	8,075,446	8,220,897
Valid votes	88.91	82.48	76.86	72.60
Valid votes/total vote	6,797,122	5,795,773	6,144,003	6,601,811
Valid votes (%/VAP)	94.95	82.95	87.34	91.60
Null votes	79.96	59.24	58.47	58.30
Null votes (%/total vote)	191,330	925,014	652,334	348,940
Null votes (%/valid votes)	2.67	13.51	9.27	5.33
Null votes (%/VAP)	2.81	15.96	10.61	5.28
Blank votes	2.25	9.45	6.20	3.08
Blank votes (%/total vote)	170,194	298,564	237,955	221,600
Blank votes (%/valid votes)	2.38	4.24	3.38	3.07
Blank votes (%/VAP)	2.50	5.15	3.87	3.35
Formal abstention (%) <sup>2</sup>	2.00	3.05	2.26	1.95
Potential abstention (%) <sup>3</sup>	5.27	13.01	12.89	12.75
Electoral disaffection index (%) <sup>4</sup>	15.78	28.24	33.04	36.65
	22.53	49.40	54.02	57.42

<sup>1</sup>For 1989, VAP data corresponds to 1990.

<sup>2</sup>Formal abstention: sum of valid votes, null votes and blank votes divided by registered voters.

<sup>3</sup>Potential abstention: sum of valid votes, null votes and blank votes divided by VAP.

<sup>4</sup>Electoral Disaffection Index: sum of valid votes, blank votes, null votes and abstentions divided by registered voters. Source: Data from the Chilean Electoral Service ([www.servel.cl](http://www.servel.cl)) and Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas ([www.ine.cl](http://www.ine.cl)).

voters, as well as on the ever more predictable character of the behavior of the voters who vote, where 9 of 10 voters vote for candidates of the Concertación or Alianza. Although it is not possible to categorically affirm what logic leads voters to vote this way, be they coalition or party loyalties, strategic rationalities, adhesions aimed at awarding incumbents, social determinations underlying the electoral behavior, or continuity of the cleavage democracy/dictatorship,<sup>59</sup> my hypothesis is that the party democracy in Chile is based on inertial properties of the electorate, from which the dominant coalitions benefit greatly.

The inertial properties of the Chilean electorate can be explained in part by declining interest in voting altogether. In 1988, the year of the famous plebiscite leading to the defeat of General Pinochet, the difference between the VAP and the registered electorate was about 1 million persons, but by 2005 it was 3 million, rising to 3.5 million at the time of the municipal elections of 2008. Voters younger than 30 were less inclined to register, and as a consequence the average age of registered voters was higher. But even the members of this aging electorate, used to voting in a certain way and socialized into politics at the time of dictatorship, were more and more inclined not to vote at all, taking refuge in abstention. In the presidential election of 2005, the socialist candidate of the Concertación won by 32.88 percent of the VAP but 53.5% of the actual vote; her opponent, Sebastián Piñera, candidate of the Alliance for Chile, had 28.58% of the potential vote and 46.5% of the actual vote. In 2008, the Alliance for Chile obtained its first victory over the Concertación in municipal elections for mayors (but not for councilors), but it did so in an election when 2 million registered voters abstained. And when the Concertación won in the municipal elections in 2008, it was with a rate of slightly more than 30% abstentionists. There are presently many Chilean senators serving after winning seats with less than 15% of the potential vote. Needless to say, these figures pose serious problems regarding the legitimacy of elected representatives.

Given the growing strength of this stagnant electorate, many recommend making registration automatic and voting optional. But there is little chance that this reform will be put in place before the presidential and legislative elections of December 2009, given the fact that it would augment the electorate automatically and abruptly by more than 3.5 million persons, making the election at least theoretically extremely uncertain. It is true that most political forces agree on automatic registration; but the question is when it will be politically feasible to enact and whether or not voting should at the same time be made optional.

In any case, if one can speak of a stable democracy in Chile, it is first of all because the country has been able to conclude its transition and normalize a democratic regime. But it has to be recognized that this is because of the electoral stability of the two principal coalitions and the "frozen" character of the electorate. It is possible that the current

opposition, the Alliance for Chile, may win the next presidential election (see Epilogue). But that will be due less to an ideological shift of the electorate than to the personal attraction of its candidate Sebastián Piñera, as well as to the political difficulties of the Concertación since coming to power in 1990. Such a result will not change the fundamental democratic stability, synonymous with inertial democracy. The competition will be based on a limited electorate whose behavior is all but "mechanical" and not at all inclined to break the monopoly of the two principal coalitions, although they may bring about an alternation between the two of them. The inertial aspect of Chilean democracy is apparent in the remarkable electoral stability of the parties and the coalitions they form, a stability leaving little chance for the appearance of new forces.

### The Machinations That Make It Work

It is not by chance that behind the coalition's or party's decisions on congressional candidates there exist practices well adjusted to the predictable character of the electorate. First, the way the slate presented to Congress by the Concertación is assembled must be considered. According to Siavelis, the system works very much like an insurance policy: even the losers (those placed lower on the slate who do not win elective posts) can count on being given good places in government. This depends, of course, upon an overall Concertación victory, something that becomes more likely as time goes by, given the general tendency to reelect incumbents. Conversely, Alianza por Chile, which cannot hope to double the Concertación in a given district (with one exception since 1993), puts together its candidate lists to guarantee one of the seats in contention and to avoid being overtaken in certain districts. Thus, understanding the inertial aspects of the electorate in Chile gives us a better understanding of the reasons for the predominance of the Concertación, followed by the opposition Alianza.<sup>60</sup>

However, in 2007, Morales and Poveda developed a way of determining when a candidate would have an "Absolute Margin of Electoral Security" (AMES), that is, where the candidate would have more than 33.3% of the vote in a district.<sup>61</sup> This predictive measure combines the verified electoral force of every party of both coalitions and the institutional properties of the binomial system. Morales and Poveda applied it to the PDC and found that the party reached the AMES in 18 districts in 1989 and 1993, 10 in 1997, 6 in 2001, and 10 in 2005, for a total of 60. When one reconstructs the AMES for each of the six parties with steady representation in the lower house (Table 6.5), what becomes apparent is the increasing number of seats that are distributed this way. While in 1989, 26.66% of the seats were distributed by means of the AMES, in the legislative elections of 2005 it was almost 36%, slightly lower than the 38% observed in 2001. The increase in the number of seats won

**Table 6.5 Evolution of Seats Obtained by Parties Based on Absolute Margin of Electoral Security (AMES) in Legislative Elections, 1989–2005**

	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005
CDP	18	18	10	5	10
PPD	6	7	5	10	17
SP	Did not compete	5	8	6	7
Radical Social Democrat Party	1	0	1	0	3
National Renewal Independent	7	8	7	9	1
Democrat Union	0	1	5	16	5
Total seats obtained under AMES	32	39	36	46	43
Seats obtained under AMES (%)	26.66	32.5	30	38.33	35.83

*Note:* AMES figures only individual performance of candidates running under a coalition list, as opposed to the total performance of the list.

through the AMES is explained, in the first place, by the remarkable capacity of the Concertación parties to reach the 33.3% threshold of votes: in fact, in the legislative elections of 2005, the Concertación parties won more than half of their deputies by this route. Second, it is also the result of the gradual learning on the part of the parties of the Alianza por Chile (especially the UDI) regarding the most efficient use of the binomial system up to the 2001 elections. Although this was followed by a decrease to a minimum of six seats, that reflects a relatively more balanced distribution of the votes, below 33.3%, between the UDI and RN at the district level.

From the viewpoint of coalitions and not of parties, AMES is attained by the Concertación and Alianza por Chile in practically all the districts (a total of 60): 58 in 1989, and 59 in the four subsequent elections. Although the Concertación exhibits a success rate at AMES level in almost all the districts, the Alianza has also increased its effectiveness, going from a minimum of 31 districts in 1989 to 45 in 2005, to a maximum of 54 in 2001. This means that the dispute between these two coalitions for one of the two seats, be it to obtain an advantage in the case of the Concertación or to prevent it on the part of the Alianza, has been remarkably reduced: while in 1989, 30 seats were really in dispute, only 16 were so in 2005 (and only 7 in 2001). Thus, the uncertainty of the competition, that is, the percentage of seats that escape the incidence of the AMES, has declined from a maximum of 25% in 1989 to only 13% in 2005.

As a first approximation, the number of seats shown in Table 6.5 reflects the mechanical impact of the AMES for each party. But more deeply, the considerable proportion of seats that are distributed to the parties by means of the AMES, and a fortiori on a coalition scale, is not explained only by the institutional properties of the binomial system. What prevails in this mode of distribution is efficient use of the binomial system based on the knowledge acquired by the coalitions and the parties about the behavior of the electorate. This efficiency is transformed into an almost perfect electoral certainty with respect to the majority of seats in dispute, objectively taking away competitiveness from the legislative elections in Chile. It can therefore be explained that with such low levels of uncertainty, which are consistent with the low electoral volatility observed by means of the Pedersen index, the competition is transferred to the interior of the coalitions. Declining competition between the coalitions has become the main object of criticism of the binomial system on the part of its detractors.<sup>62</sup>

## CONCLUSION

It is important to remember that this critique does not take into consideration all the variables involved. The institutional dimensions of the binomial system do not produce consequences by themselves alone, and even less do they unilaterally explain the electoral monopoly from which both the Concertación and Alianza por Chile benefit. If this monopoly is confirmed election after election, it is due to the increasing gap between the VAP and the actual voters, which makes the behavior of the electorate extremely predictable. In becoming predictable, the natural uncertainty about the results of the elections is reduced considerably, which allows the parties and the coalitions to recruit candidates by appealing to the certainties provided by both the promise of appointments to government posts (the "insurance policy") and the AMES. The high rate of reelection of incumbents further amplifies the barely competitive character of the Chilean legislative elections.

The excessive stability of the Chilean political system can be explained by the combined impact of all these variables. The result makes it possible to speak of democracy in Chile, but only as a very special case, the case of inertial democracy. At present Chile is a democracy that permits only two political forces (coalitions), each supported by far less than a majority of the voting age population, to compete effectively for power.

## EPILOGUE

On January 17, 2009, Sebastian Pinera did in fact win election to the presidency by a 52% to 48% margin (see page 145).

51. Survey carried out by IUPERJ between December 12 and 15, 2004. Home interviews were made in 115 municipalities in the entire country.

52. For many years, PT was an exception in the Brazilian party scenario, since it gambled on constructing party reputation during the election campaign. See Samuels, "Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-centric Electoral Systems"; Nicolau, "O Sistema Eleitoral de Lista Aberta no Brasil."

53. Shaun Bowler, "Parties in Legislatures: Two Competing Explanations," in *Parties Without Partisans*, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 157–179; Michael F. Thies, "On the Primacy of Party Government: Why Legislative Parties Can Survive Party Decline in the Electorate," in *Parties without Partisans*, eds. Dalton and Wattenberg, 238–257.

54. John Aldrich, "Political Parties In and Out of Legislatures," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Berta Rockman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 555–576.

55. Kaare Strøm, "Parties at the Core of Government," in *Parties without Partisans*, ed. Dalton and Wattenberg, 180–207.

56. G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000); Powell, "The Chain of Responsiveness"; Strøm, "Parties at the Core of Government"; Kaare Strøm, "Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies," *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (2000): 261–289.

57. For a general view of parties in the federal executive, see Octavio Amorim Neto, "Algumas Consequências Políticas de Lula: Novos Padrões de Formação e Recrutamento Ministerial, Controle de Agenda e Produção Legislativa," in *Instituições Representativas no Brasil: Balanço e Reforma*, ed. Jairo Nicolau and Timothy J. Power (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007), 55–73; Octavio Amorim Neto, "O Poder Executivo, Centro de Gravidade do Sistema Político Brasileiro," in *Sistema Político Brasileiro: Uma Introdução*, 2nd edition, ed. Antônio Octávio Cintra and Lúcia Avelar (São Paulo: Fundação Konrad Adenauer/Editora Unesp, 2007), 131–141; Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, *Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 1999).

58. Maria Celina D'Araujo, *Governo Lula: Contornos Sociais e Políticos da Elite do Poder* (Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, 2007), 16. This data pertains to the year 2006.

59. *Ibid.*, 39.

60. Amorim Neto, "O Poder Executivo"; Figueiredo and Limongi, *Executivo e Legislativo*.

61. PV (Partido Verde; Green Party) is a small ecologist party founded in 1986. PRB (Brazilian Renewal Party) is a small center-right party created in 2005.

62. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," *Party Politics* 1 (1995): 5–28

63. Figueiredo and Limongi, *Executivo e Legislativo*.

64. Performance of parties in Brazilian Nacional Congress (in particular, in the Chamber of Deputies) has deserved special attention from political scientists; for a general view of the large bibliography on this subject, see Antônio Octávio Cintra and Marcelo Lacombe, "A Câmara dos Deputados na Nova República: a Visão da Ciência Política," in *Sistema Político Brasileiro: Uma*

*Introdução*, 2nd edition, ed. Antônio Octávio Cintra and Lúcia Avelar (São Paulo: Fundação Konrad Adenauer/Editora Unesp, 2007), 143–182; Leany Barreiro Lemos, *O Senado Federal Brasileiro no Pós-Constituinte* (Brasília: Senado Federal, 2008).

65. Constitutional amendments and complementary laws are always roll-call voted; ordinary laws and provisional measures are so voted only when requested by at least 31 deputies.

66. Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo and Fernando Limongi, "Instituições Políticas e Governabilidade: Desempenho do Governo e Apoio Legislativo na Democracia Brasileira," in *A Democracia Brasileira: Balanço e Perspectivas para o Século XXI*, ed. Carlos Ranulfo Melo and Manuel Alcântara Sáez (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2007), 147–198; Figueiredo and Limongi, *Executivo e Legislativo*; Jairo Nicolau, "Disciplina Partidária e Base Parlamentar na Câmara dos Deputados no Primeiro Governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–98)," *Dados* 43 (2000): 709–735; Barry Ames, *Os Entraves da Democracia no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2001).

67. Party unity index is found by dividing the total majority votes of a given party by the total deputies of same party present at a given vote.

68. Bowler, "Parties in Legislatures," 170–174.

69. Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, *Vital Statistics on American Politics 2005–2006* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 218–219.

70. Melo, "Nem Tanto ao Mar, Nem Tanto a Terra: Elementos para uma Análise do Sistema Partidário Brasileiro," 288.

71. Carlos Ranulfo Melo, *Retirando as Cadeiras do Lugar: Migração Partidária na Câmara dos Deputados (1985–2002)* (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2004).

72. Ferraz, *Poder Judiciário e Competição Política*, 184.

73. *Ibid.*, 189.

74. Strøm, "Parties at the Core of Government"; Powell, "The Chain of Responsiveness."

75. William B. Heller and Carol Mershon, "Party Switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1996–2001," *Journal of Politics* 67 (2005): 536–559; Matt Golder, "Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2000," *Electoral Studies* 24 (2005): 103–121.

## CHAPTER 6, POLITICAL PARTIES IN CHILE: STABLE COALITIONS, INERT DEMOCRACY

1. Simon Collier and William E. Sater, *Historia de Chile, 1808–1994* (Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 10.

2. Joe Foweraker, "Institutional Design, Party Systems and Governability. Differentiating the Presidential Regimes of Latin America," *British Journal of Political Science* 28 (1998): 657, 659.

3. Other examples include Maurice Zeitlin, "Los determinantes sociales de la democracia política en Chile," in *América Latina: ¿reforma o revolución?*, ed. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Buenos Aires: Editorial Tiempo Contemporáneo, 1970), 178. This is precisely the common sense expressed in countless comparative studies, generally through surveys drawn from "experts" asked to evaluate

the solidity of the democratic institutions of each country. Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," *Journal of Politics* 29 (1967): 129-166; Kenneth F. Johnson, "Scholarly Images of Latin American Political Democracy in 1975," *Latin American Research Review* 11 (1976): 125-140.

4. Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "A Political Scientist's Point of View," *American Political Science Review* 44 (1950): 124, argued that these countries had the highest percentages of population of European origin.

5. Ronald H. McDonald, "Electoral Systems, Party Representation, and Political Change in Latin America," *Western Political Quarterly* 20 (1967): 702, 704.

6. J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratización vía reforma: la expansión del sufragio en Chile* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del IDES, 1985); Alfredo Joignant, "El lugar del voto. La ley electoral de 1874 y la invención del ciudadano-electoral en Chile," *Estudios Públicos* 81 (2001): 245-275; Alfredo Joignant, "Un sanctuaire électoral. Le bureau de vote et l'invention du citoyen-électeur au Chili à la fin du XIX<sup>ème</sup> siècle," *Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire* 49 (2002): 29-47.

7. Josep M. Colomer, "Taming the Tiger: Voting Rights and Political Instability in Latin America," *Latin American Politics and Society* 46 (2004): 40-42. For studies noting limits and inaccuracies in this work see J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Making Sense of Suffrage Expansion and Electoral Institutions in Latin America: A Comment on Colomer's 'Tiger,'" *Latin American Politics and Society* 46 (2004): 59-67; and Alfredo Joignant, "Modelos, juegos y artefactos. Supuestos, premisas e ilusiones de los estudios electorales y de sistemas de partidos en Chile (1988-2005)," *Estudios Públicos* 106 (2007): 208-209.

8. J. Samuel Valenzuela, "La ley electoral de 1890 y la democratización del régimen político chileno," *Estudios Públicos* 71 (1998): 275.

9. Eduardo Posada-Carbó, "Electoral Juggling: A Comparative History of the Corruption of Suffrage in Latin America, 1830-1930," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32 (2000): 642.

10. In this sense, the sociohistory of the act of voting and of the various technologies that coded the expansion of voters, as well as the history of universal voting rights in France, provide essential methodological lessons to understand the comparative genesis and evolution of an electoral democracy and of a party-based democracy such the Chilean democracy. Alain Garrigou, "Le secret de l'isoloir," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 71-72 (1988): 25-45 (on the secret chamber); Olivier Ihl, "L'urne électorale. Formes et usages d'une technique de vote," *Revue française de science politique* 43 (1993): 30-60 (on the ballot box); Michel Offerlé, "Le nombre des voix. Electeurs, partis et électorat socialistes à la fin du XIX<sup>ème</sup> siècle en France," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 71-72 (1988): 5-21 (on the cartographic and social construction of electorate); Michel Offerlé, "L'électeur et ses papiers. Enquête sur les cartes et les listes électorales (1848-1939)," *Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire* 13 (1993): 29-53 (on electoral ID cards); Yves Déloye and Olivier Ihl, "Des voix pas comme les autres," *Revue française de science politique* 2 (1991): 141-170 (on blank and nonvalid votes); Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le sacre du citoyen. Histoire du suffrage universel en France* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992); Alain Garrigou, *Histoire du suffrage universel en France, 1848-2000* (Paris: Seuil, 2002); and Michel Offerlé, *Un homme, une voix? Histoire du suffrage universel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993) (on the social and political history of universal suffrage in France).

11. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967); J. Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy R. Scully, "De la democracia a la democracia: continuidad y variaciones en las preferencias del electorado y en el sistema de partidos en Chile," *Estudios Públicos* 51 (1993): 195-228; J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Orígenes y transformaciones del sistema de partidos en Chile," *Estudios Públicos* 58 (1995): 5-80.

12. See Roger S. Abbott, "The Role of Contemporary Political Parties in Chile," *American Political Science Review* 45 (1951): 450-462, on the early influence of France on Chilean political life.

13. Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels, "Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations," *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 579.

14. For an interesting analysis of the problems posed by the concept "populism" in Latin American politics, see Kurt Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics," *Comparative Politics* 34 (2001): 1-22. For a comparative analysis of the populist "phenomenon" on a global scale, see Olivier Ihl et al., *La tentation populiste au coeur de l'Europe* (Paris: La Découverte, 2003); Guy Hermet, *Les populismes dans le monde. Une histoire sociologique XIX<sup>e</sup>-XX<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 2001); and Yves Mény and Yves Surel, *Par le peuple, pour le peuple. Le populisme et les démocraties* (Paris: Fayard, 2000).

15. Jean Gruegel, "Populism and the Political System in Chile: Ibañismo (1952-1958)," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 11 (1992): 169-186.

16. John D. Martz, "Doctrine and Dilemmas of the Latin American 'New Left,'" *World Politics* 22 (1970): 171-196.

17. See on the Communist Party (PC), Hernán Ramírez Necochea, *Origen y formación del Partido Comunista de Chile* (Santiago: Austral, 1965); on the Socialist Party (PS), Julio Cesar Jobet, *El Partido Socialista de Chile*, 2 vols. (Santiago: Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1971); Benny Pollack, "The Chilean Socialist Party: Prolegomena to Its Ideology and Organization," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 10 (1978): 117-152; and on the rivalry between the two David R. Corkill, "The Chilean Socialist Party and the Popular Front 1933-41," *Journal of Contemporary History* 11 (1976): 261-273. In English on the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), Tad Szulc, "Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 360 (1965): 99-109; Emmanuel De Kadt, "Paternalism and Populism: Catholicism in Latin America," *Journal of Contemporary History* 2 (1967): 89-106; George W. Grayson, Jr., "Chile's Christian Democratic Party: Power, Factions, and Ideology," *The Review of Politics* 31 (1969): 147-171; Michael Dodson, "The Christian Left in Latin American Politics," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 21 (1979): 45-68.

18. For example, Steven W. Sinding, "The Evolution of Chilean Voting Patterns: A Re-examination of Some Old Assumptions," *Journal of Politics* 34 (1972): 774-796, through the creation of an electorate stability index between 1920 and 1960; and Arturo Valenzuela, "The Scope of the Chilean Party System," *Comparative Politics* 4 (1972): 179-199; Arturo Valenzuela, "Political Participation, Agriculture, and Literacy: Communal versus Provincial Voting Patterns in Chile," *Latin American Research Review* 12 (1977): 105-114.

19. Valenzuela, "The Scope of the Chilean Party System."

20. Glaucio Soares and Robert L. Hamblin, "Socio-Economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952," *American Political Science Review* 61 (1967): 1053-1065.

21. Alejandro Portes, "Leftist Radicalism in Chile: A Test of Three Hypotheses," *Comparative Politics* 2 (1970): 251-274.

22. Sandra Powell, "Political Change in the Chilean Electorate 1952-1964," *Western Political Quarterly* 23 (1970): 380.

23. Remember that "the Charter of the Alliance called for greater international cooperation, deep domestic structural reforms, sustained economic development, more equitable economic distribution, and better public services." This mission explains why the Alliance received US\$20 billion. Javier Corrales and Richard E. Feinberg, "Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 11, note 18.

24. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, "Los mineros y el extremismo agrario," in *América Latina: ¿reforma o revolución?*, ed. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Buenos Aires: Editorial Tiempo Contemporáneo, 1970), 201.

25. Giovanni Sartori, *Partidos y sistemas de partidos* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1976).

26. Juan J. Linz and Alfredo Stepan, ed., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

27. Arturo Valenzuela, *El quiebre de la democracia en Chile* (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2003, first edition in English 1978).

28. Henry A. Landsbergen and Tim McDaniel, "Hypermobilization in Chile, 1970-1973," *World Politics* 28 (1976): 502-541.

29. For a severe criticism of this approach, see Nancy Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times. The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 162, who does not observe massive electoral polarization phenomena in Chile, but a "dramatic change in the size of the electorate" that increased by 1,280,000 people between 1969 and 1973. In this same sense, James W. Prothro and Patricio E. Chaparro, "Public Opinion and the Movement of Chilean Government to the Left, 1952-72," *Journal of Politics* 36 (1974): 2-43, find no important correlations between the increasing left-wing inclinations of Chilean governments between 1952 and 1972 and the left-wing orientation of "public opinion" based on survey data.

30. Tomás Moulian, *Chile actual: anatomía de un mito* (Santiago: LOM, 1997).

31. Sartori, *Partidos y sistemas de partidos*; Valenzuela, *El quiebre de la democracia en Chile*.

32. Manuel Antonio Garretón, *El proceso político chileno* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1983); Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Hacia una nueva era política. Estudio sobre las democratizaciones* (Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995).

33. Steve J. Stern, *The Memory Box of Pinochet's Chile*, vol. 2: *Battling for Hearts and Minds. Memory Struggles in Pinochet's Chile, 1973-1988* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006), 180, note 27.

34. Alfredo Joignant and Patricio Navia, "From Politics by Individuals to Party Militancy: Socialization, Political Competition and Electoral Growth of the Chilean UDI," in *When Parties Prosper: The Uses of Electoral Success*, ed. Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Rienner, 2007), 249-272. "Gremialismo" was a student movement that became a political movement during the reform of

the Catholic University, and was characterized by a radical critique of liberal democracy and the defense of corporatist ideas inspired by Spanish Francoism.

35. A first approach can be found in Alfredo Joignant, *El gesto y la palabra* (Santiago: LOM-Arcis, 1998, chapter 3). This in itself is an area worthy of further exploration, only partially tackled in relation to the Communist Party by Carmelo Furci, "The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) and Its Third Underground Period, 1973-1980," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 2 (1982): 81-95; and by Rolando Álvarez, *Desde las sombras. Una historia de la clandestinidad comunista (1973-1980)* (Santiago: LOM, 2003).

36. Gerardo L. Munck, "Democratic Stability and Its Limits: An Analysis of Chile's 1993 Elections," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36 (1994): 6.

37. Oscar Godoy, "La transición chilena a la democracia: pactada," *Estudios Públicos* 74 (1999): 79-106.

38. Alfredo Joignant and Amparo Menéndez-Carrión, "De la 'democracia de los acuerdos' a los dilemas de la polis: ¿transición incompleta o ciudadanía pendiente?" in *La caja de Pandora: el retorno de la transición chilena*, ed. Amparo Menéndez-Carrión and Alfredo Joignant (Santiago: Planeta-Ariel, 1999), 13-48.

39. Paul W. Posner, "Popular Representation and Political Dissatisfaction in Chile's New Democracy," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 41 (1999): 59-85.

40. During the year 2000, the old Radical Party (PR) became Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (now PRSD) after it merged with the small Social Democracia Party. On the other hand, Partido por la Democracia (PPD) was created in 1987 as an instrumental force for the 1988 plebiscite, incorporating socialist party leaders and members, as well as members of other left-wing organizations that were illegal at that time. It became consolidated as a catch-all center-left political party.

41. RN was founded in 1987, while UDI claims that it was created in 1983 (for age problems in this political party, see Joignant and Navia, "From Politics by Individuals to Party Militancy."

42. We rely here on Paul W. Posner, "Local Democracy and the Transformation of Popular Participation in Chile," *Latin American Politics and Society* 46 (2004): 57.

43. There were nine appointed senators, plus the lifelong senators (ex-presidents of the republic) who were all eliminated after the 2005 constitutional reforms because they were regarded as "authoritarian enclaves" capable of limiting popular sovereignty: for an analysis of the Chilean transition within the framework of these enclaves, see Mark Ensalaco, "In with the New, Out with the Old? The Democratizing Impact of Constitutional Reform in Chile," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26 (1994): 409-429.

44. For a detailed analysis of Chilean elections since 1989, see Patricio Navia, "Participación electoral en Chile, 1988-2001," *Revista de ciencia política* 24 (2004): 81-103; and José Miguel Izquierdo and Patricio Navia, "Cambio y continuidad en la elección de Bachelet," *América Latina Hoy* 46 (2007): 75-96.

45. In this case, the votes obtained by the PC are excluded because they do not form part of Concertación.

46. It is important to point out that the votes obtained by these four parties in 1989 are absolutely equivocal, since on this occasion the Socialist and

Communist parties could not compete because of legal prohibitions. Thus, the average vote of these four traditional parties rises to 42.16% if the 1989 elections are not considered, two points less than in municipal elections. In any case, caution is advisable regarding the supposed electoral continuity of these parties, because behind the appearance of permanence there are deep underlying discontinuities regarding their militancy, methods of organization, leaders, doctrinal references, and appropriations of the brands: Michel Offerlé, *Les partis politiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987). This same precaution should be prioritized with regard to the parties of the right, which exhibits an evident discontinuity—formal and of its parliamentary elites: Joignant and Navia, "From Politics by Individuals," Cordero, "La composición social de la nueva cámara de diputados," in *Documento de Trabajo ICSSO-Universidad Diego Portales* (Santiago, 2005), 8, for evidence based on analyses of generational cohorts of the deputies—up to 1973. On this point, we disagreed strongly with J. Esteban Montes; Scott Mainwaring, and Eugenio Ortega, "Rethinking the Chilean Party Systems," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32 (2000): 804, who introduce a false and direct continuity between the right of the 1990s under the cloak of RN and the Partido Nacional of the mid-1960s, in circumstances when its denomination did not even survive.

47. According to a recent opinion poll, identification with Concertación has declined between June and July 2006 and March and April 2008 from 32% to 25%, as opposed to Alianza por Chile (which has remained stable at 16%) and the extraparliamentary left grouped in the Juntos Podemos Más coalition (near 7% average support), with an increasing predominance of those who do not identify with any pact (41% in the first measurement and 49% in the last). This phenomenon of nonidentification is still more obvious regarding parties, since in March and April 2008, 53% of voters did not identify with any party: *Estudio Nacional sobre partidos políticos y sistema electoral* (March–April 2008).

48. Valenzuela and Scully, "De la democracia a la democracia."

49. Under the problematic assumption that the coalitions of parties existing until 1973 (Unidad Popular) and the PDC (without alliances) would still be relevant in electoral terms at the beginning of the nineties: Valenzuela and Scully, "De la democracia a la democracia," 198; for an analysis extending this assumption to 1992, see J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Orígenes y transformaciones del sistema de partidos en Chile," *Estudios Públicos* 58 (1995): 5–80.

50. Valenzuela, "Orígenes y transformaciones."

51. Eugenio Tironi and Felipe Agüero, "¿Sobrevivirá el nuevo paisaje político chileno?" *Estudios Públicos* 74 (1999): 151–168. Mariano Torcal and Scott Mainwaring, "The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 1973–95," *British Journal of Political Science* 33 (2003): 55–84.

52. Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*.

53. Thus, it does not seem possible to resolve this dispute empirically, since it originates in different interpretations and readings of cleavage theory. In this regard, Joignant, "Modelos, juegos y artefactos," 238–249; also, J. Samuel Valenzuela, Timothy R. Scully, and Nicolás Somma, "The Enduring Presence of Religion in Chilean Ideological Positionings and Voter Options," *Comparative Politics* 40 (2007): 17.

54. As is well known, Pedersen introduces his electoral volatility index adding the net, positive or negative, change to the percentage of votes obtained by each

party in one legislative election or another, such that the higher levels reflect greater degrees of volatility. Mogens N. Pedersen, "The Dynamics of West European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility," *European Journal of Political Research* 7 (1979): 1–26, and "Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948–1977: Explorations and Explanations," in *Western European Party Systems. Continuity and Change*, ed. Hans Daalder and Peter Mair (London: Sage, 1983): 29–66.

55. The DataGob indicators can be found at <http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/>, with data for Chile updated until 2001.

56. For analysis purposes, the elections of 1989 are not considered for assessing electoral volatility at the party level due to the exceptional character of these elections (first during the transition) and the fact that the Socialist and Communist parties could not participate in them.

57. Payne et al. record 2.07 in 1997: Mark Payne et al., *La política importa. Democracia y desarrollo en América Latina* (Washington D.C.: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo e Instituto Internacional para la Democracia y la Asistencia Electoral, 2003): 129, whereas Cabezas and Navia report 3.84 for the period 1989–2001: José Miguel Cabezas and Patricio Navia, "Efectos del sistema binominal en el número de candidatos y de partidos en elecciones legislativas en Chile, 1989–2001," *Política* 45 (2005): 41. Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "'Effective' Number of Parties. A Measure with Application to West Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1979): 3–27.

58. Over a much longer time span, López Pintor concluded that for the period 1945–2001, Chile exhibited a rate of 45.9% of VAP registered voters, in 11 legislative elections, placing it in position 145 among 169 countries: Rafael López Pintor, "Voter Turnout Rates from a Comparative Perspective," in *Voter Turnout Since 1945. A Global Report*, ed. Rafael López Pintor et al. (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2002), 84. Although this mediocre performance is explained, partly, by the belated access of women to the right to vote in legislative elections and by the slow materialization of potential voters as voters properly registered in the electoral registers (in 1953, the registered electorate reached 17% of the VAP, in 1963, 31.3% and in 1973, 44.1%, numbers that are not in line with the widespread hypermobilization, generalized politicization, and extreme "polarization" hypotheses for "explaining" the democratic breakdown of 1973 due to dynamic "centrifuges" [Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times*, 144]), the steady widening of the gap during the period 1993–2005 between the registered electorate and the VAP could be interpreted as the reproduction of a relatively "normal" historical tendency to disaffection.

59. In this regard, the classic "ecological fallacy" identified by Robinson, has tended to transform itself in Chile into more of an obstacle to understanding the principles of vote generation, rather than a methodological precaution aimed at preventing the investigator from inferring from the electoral data explanations of the conduct of the voters: William S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review* 15 (1950): 351–357. In this regard, it is necessary to move from the analyses of the institutional and electoral contexts of voting to more complete explanations of the social logics that lead to voting in a particular way: in this respect, a first approximation is the one by Miguel Ángel López and Mauricio Morales, "La capacidad

explicativa de los determinantes familiares en las preferencias electorales de los chilenos," *Política* 45 (2005): 87–108.

60. Peter M. Siavelis, "Coalition, Voters and Party System Transformation in Post-authoritarian Chile," *Government and Opposition* 37 (2002): 76–105; Peter M. Siavelis, "The Hidden Logic of Candidate Selection for Chilean Parliamentary Elections," *Comparative Politics* 34 (2002): 419–438; John M. Carey and Peter M. Siavelis, "El 'seguro' para los subcampeones electorales y la sobrevivencia de la Concertación," *Estudios Públicos* 90 (2003): 5–27.

61. Mauricio Morales and Antonio Poveda, "El PDC: bases electorales, determinantes de adhesión e impacto en las votaciones de R. Lagos y M. Bachelet," *Estudios Públicos*, 107 (2007), 129–165.

62. Peter M. Siavelis, "Electoral Reform Doesn't Matter—or Does It? A Moderate Proportional Representation System for Chile," *Revista de ciencia política* 26 (2006): 216–225; Dieter Nohlen, "La reforma del sistema binominal desde una perspectiva comparada," *Revista de ciencia política* 26 (2006): 191–202; for arguments that question this aspect, John Carey, "Las virtudes del sistema binominal," *Revista de ciencia política* 26 (2006): 226–235.

#### CHAPTER 7, POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN MEXICO: THE ENDLESS CHAIN OF ELECTORAL REFORMS

1. Susan Stokes, "¿Son los Partidos Políticos el Problema de la Democracia en América Latina?" *Política y Gobierno* 1 (1998): 13–46.

2. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 14–33.

3. Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Rejuvenation* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

4. These dilemmas have to be addressed in any process of democratic design. See Richard Katz and William Crotty, *Handbook of Party Politics* (London: Sage, 2006).

5. Institutionalization is a matter of degrees. Following Mainwaring and Scully the institutionalization of party systems has four dimensions: patterns of party competition, roots in society, legitimacy, and the control on party leaders. See Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, "Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America," in *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995). In Mexico, the system has a medium level of institutionalization, although each party within the system has internally different levels of institutionalization.

6. Three of these minor parties, PVEM (Mexican Green, Ecologist Party), PT (Labor Party), and Convergencia Democrática (Democratic Convergence), always support one of the major candidate's parties for the presidency. The other minor party, Alternativa Socialdemócrata y Campesina (Social Democratic and Peasant Alternative), was created before the 2006 election and has its own candidates for the presidency.

7. In countries like Uruguay and Chile, the current parties were created under democracy and suspended after the military coups. After the transitions to democracy, the same old parties reemerged. See Manuel Antonio Garretón

*Hacia Una Nueva Era Política: Estudio Sobre las Democratizaciones* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1998).

8. The Mexican case showed similarities with the process in the Communist party-systems where inclusion preceded contestation. For postcommunist cases, see Zsolt Enyedi, "Party Politics in Post-Communist Transition," in *Handbook of Party Politics*, ed. Richard Katz and William Crotty (London: Sage, 2006).

9. Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

10. Soledad Loaeza, *El Partido Acción Nacional: la Larga Marcha, 1939–1994: Oposición Leal y Partido de Protesta* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999).

11. Soledad Loaeza, "El Partido Acción Nacional: La Oposición Leal en México," in *Lecturas de Política Mexicana* (1977), 161.

12. The social Left includes an important number of social organizations some of them with revolutionary origins, while others are formed by students and neighbor based organizations.

13. Víctor H. Martínez, *Fisiones y Fusiones, Divorcios y Reconciliaciones: La Dirigencia del Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) 1989–2004* (México: Plaza y Valdés/Centro de Estudios Políticos y Sociales de Monterrey/Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales/Facultad de Contaduría y Administración [UNAM]/FLACSO, 1999).

14. Valdimer O. Key Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics* 17 (1955): 3–18.

15. Guadalupe Pacheco, *Caleidoscopio Electoral: Elecciones en México, 1979–1999* (México: IFE/UAM-X/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000).

16. The Federal District is the capital of Mexico where the federal government quarters are situated.

17. Edgar Butler et al., "An Examination of the Official Results of the 1988 Mexican Presidential Election," in *Sucesión presidencial: The 1988 Mexican Presidential Election*, ed. Victoria E. Rodríguez and Peter M. Ward (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995); Kathleen Bruhn, *Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

18. Jorge Domínguez and James McCann, *Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion and Electoral Choice* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

19. Esperanza Palma, *Las Bases Políticas de la Alternancia en México: Un Estudio del PAN y el PRD Durante la Democratización* (México: UAM-A, 2004).

20. This was established in the Federal Law of Electoral Procedures and Institutions (COFIPE) approved in 1996.

21. Pablo Javier Becerra, "Las Elecciones de 1997: La Nueva Lógica de la Competencia," in *Después del PRI: Las Elecciones de 1997 y los Escenarios de la Transición en México*, ed. César Cancino (México: Centro de Estudios de Política Comparada, 1998), 75–96.

22. Palma, *Las Bases Políticas de la Alternancia en México*.

23. The analysis of the conflicts between the president and Congress that have taken place since 1997 exceeds the limits of this chapter. Some scholars show that the rate of approval of presidential initiatives by Congress has decreased importantly: from 99 percent in 1994–1997 to 70 percent in 2003–2006. See Laura Valencia Escamilla, "Puntos de Veto en la Relación Ejecutivo-Legislativo," *Sociológica* 62 (2006): 56.