

WHEN **PARTIES** **PROSPER**

The Uses of Electoral Success

EDITED BY

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1

Political Parties in the Twenty-First Century

KAY LAWSON AND PETER H. MERKL

Major changes in the world have changed the rules of the game of party politics, as well as the players and the arenas in which the game is played. New forms of communication and new ways to finance ever more expensive campaigns characterize the spread of globalization and domestic politics alike. New parties have proliferated, and older parties have come back to life by adding new leaders, new followers, new policies, and sometimes new names, even as they maintain strong links to the ideas and programs of the past.

Have these changes reversed what so many, ourselves included, once described as the decline of parties (Lawson and Merkl 1988)? Do they mean that parties are now prospering as never before? Perhaps, but then what does it mean for parties to prosper? Does it mean parties are now better able than ever to discover the popular will, incorporate that will into their programs, educate and guide, and ensure that public policy is consistent with the resources, needs, and hopes of those they represent? Are they working better than ever to enhance the workings of democracy, and the spread of democratization?

Or does the parties' new strength conceal new weaknesses as agencies of linkage? Are parties and party systems in fact continuing to decline, as voter abstention grows, as social movements and nongovernmental organizations take on more and more of their representative roles, and as special interest groups control the selection of their candidates and the agendas of those who win election? Has party renewal come at the cost of abandoning their supposed most essential functions: the aggregation and articulation of interests, and the selection and election of representatives with close links and strong ties to a popular base? Is their prosperity limited to the size of their campaign treasuries and the fortunes they make for their leaders and those they serve? We remain convinced that vital, resilient democracies are not possible without

strong, prosperous parties. Their obvious capacity for successful adaptation to the changes that have taken place is no doubt worth a few lapses, perhaps even to the extent of being willing to overlook some instances of corruption. But have they gone too far? Are they in fact now serving more as agencies of *dédémocratization* than of democratization?

Clearly the time has come to give the ongoing debate about whether or not political parties are still in decline—or quite the opposite—a more modern, more discriminating, and more realistic focus. In order to sort out what it means to prosper, we can begin with the recognition that the word “prosperity” may or not be synonymous with “success” in the world of party politics. Winning an election is a sign of success, of course, but then again some party or combination of parties wins every election that is not instantly overturned by the military. Gaining the right to govern is another sign of success, but so is the ability to join others who do so. Does a small party prosper when it gains a foothold, however small, in a coalition government, when it changes the outcome of the electoral battle between larger parties, or simply when it gains representation for a minority or keeps an unpopular ideology alive? On the other hand, how successful is a consistently winning party when it amasses power and wealth for itself and its major donors by choosing policy paths contrary to its campaign promises and the will of its followers? Can one kind of prosperity be gained at the cost of another? At the cost of democracy?

In keeping with our own past work, together and separately, we have chosen the method of comparative study to seek answers worthy of the complexity of these questions. *When Parties Prosper* relies on the ability of eighteen experts in a wide range of nations to address these and related questions in substantive and analytical depth, to provide historical context, but also to take a hard look at parties as they exist today, and to give us and the readers of this book their answers, clearly and straightforwardly.

We have organized their chapters by partisan identification: Part 1 addresses parties of the left, Part 2 addresses parties of the right, and Part 3 compares parties from both sides of the spectrum. We have chosen this plan in recognition of the fact that left-right identification is as important for organizations as for individuals. From the very beginning of party history, successful parties were those that overcame existing dominant structures (based on aristocratic, colonial, or corporate hegemony) by identifying and taking sides in the cleavages predominant among those who contested for power, and these cleavages were clearly identifiable in left-right partisan terms (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970).

Thus, in Part I we begin with studies of prospering parties on the European left: Britain’s New Labour Party (David McKay, Chapter 2), the Swedish Social Democrats (Tommy Möller, Chapter 3), and a comparative study of several Western European social democratic parties (William E. Paterson and James Sloan, Chapter 4). In all cases, we find that prosperity is strongly linked to a

careful edging away from socialist dogma, a careful co-optation of parts of the capitalist order, and inevitably a growing difficulty in maintaining the support of their formerly most devoted followers.

It is also in Part I that we find the postcommunist left-wing parties or coalitions of Poland (Hieronim Kubiak, Chapter 5) and Lithuania (Aigis Krupavičius, Chapter 6), organizations pulled together out of the remnants of old communist parties, mass organizations, military forces, and former bureaucracies, against the background of postcommunist chaos and anarchy. Their left-wing character sometimes seems more a reflection of distant and earlier communist campaigns against nationalism and clerical and feudal leftovers of 1945 than of any present anticapitalistic sentiments. However, once launched on the sea of democratization they must inexorably jettison some baggage and take on some unfamiliar passengers (and policies), modernizing their electoral strategies in order to achieve and maintain their own prosperity, even as they find themselves unable to keep the glorious promises of their new beginnings.

Concluding Part I, Jorge Lanzaro (Chapter 7) demonstrates that the task of building a viable left-wing party after right-wing dictatorship can follow a similar path when that dictatorship has been military rather than communist. Leftist politicians in Uruguay also began their rise to electoral success by bringing together a coalition of left-wing forces long before right-wing dictatorship had fully come to an end, and they too are prospering by responding effectively to the catchall demands of democratic electioneering.

Prosperous parties on the right are the subject of Part 2. Long gone are the days when the conservative rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan dominated the messages, if not always the actual policies, of most of the ruling parties of Europe. In Britain itself, the years of moderate conservative hegemony were followed by conservative fragmentation and strife, and similar patterns are found across the continent. But not throughout the world, and even in Europe some right-wing parties have overcome this tendency, as Frank Bösch (Chapter 8) shows to be the case for Germany’s Christian Democrats. In this case, the renaissance has been brought about by many years of moderate consensus building involving business, agriculture, and the churches, plus the development of a program for governing that, if not instantly admired on the left, nonetheless avoided the kind of extreme polarization found in US politics during the same period of time.

The politicians working within Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party are similarly allied with farmers, bureaucrats, bankers, and business, against a rather protean opposition, but Haruhiko Fukui (Chapter 9) helps us to see how the ability of this party to dole out its favors with blithe disregard for ideological purity or unity has placed it in a league of its own when it comes to maintaining party prosperity, despite years of rampant and undisguised corruption. Even when seeming at last to be really down-and-out, this party made a swift return to power. Fukui tells us how.

The four remaining studies of prosperous right-wing parties in Part 2 illustrate how varied are the paths to a measure of electoral success on the right-hand side of the ledger. Russia's Unity Party, the subject of Anatoly Kulik's analysis (Chapter 10), is in fact a party with no distinguishable ideology or policy of its own beyond offering support to a right-wing politician, an identity that makes it by far the most prosperous party in the nation. The various Mexican parties that Mark A. Martinez writes about (Chapter 11) all claim to serve the people (as what party does not?), but Martinez shows how even the most avowedly leftist of the three inadvertently gave aid and succor to the National Action Party, the business-oriented right-wing opposition to the corporatist right-wing Institutional Revolutionary Party, helping to bring it electoral success and the more callow forms of prosperity, licit and illicit, that traditionally accompany such success in that nation. It is a complicated but interestingly illustrative story about the seemingly unstoppable flow of power to the right in Mexico.

Israel's Shas party has, as Yael Yishai points out (Chapter 12), yet another *modus operandi*. It has no hope of becoming a party of government in the broader sense, but has every hope, in every election, of becoming *one* of the parties of almost any coalition the Israelis may patch together. Its religious ideology is on the right, but it seeks to serve that system of belief not by helping to guide government policy, even when incorporated into a ruling alliance, but rather by putting the wealth it gains from that government into the hands of those who most devoutly serve the mission it has set for itself.

Another small party whose prosperity is based on the role it takes—or periodically threatens to take—in determining electoral outcomes is the Independent Democratic Union of Chile. It is unambiguously right-wing, if indeed not far-right, with the requisite bourgeois-military backing, hints of unrepentant fascism, and firm commitment to neoliberal/libertarian economic preferences. Alfredo Joignant and Patricia Navia (Chapter 13) show how its power to maintain itself in the post-Augusto Pinochet era rests on the old-school ties of its leaders and their strong technocratic tradition, producing a combination of obedience and efficiency that still serves to bring them the votes of the other unregenerate supporters of a bloody legacy.

Part 3 consists of chapters written by authors who chose to compare ruling parties of the left and right in Italy (Gianfranco Pasquino, Chapter 14), France (Florence Haegel and Marc Lazar, Chapter 15), and the United States (Robin Kolodny, Chapter 16). In Italy, Forza Italia owes its success to a kind of establishment opportunism that has allowed the business classes and the media under Silvio Berlusconi to forge stable alliances with former neofascists (the Italian Social Movement, now renamed National Alliance) and the regionalist, far-right Lega Lombarda. But Forza Italia is also united by an abiding hatred of the labor unions, the former communists and socialists, and the leftist intelligentsia. On the left, the Democratic Socialists have managed to create the Olive

Tree coalition and come to power, but it has never had the easy capacity to jettison conflicting issue stances among its members and partners that Forza brings to the game of winning power. Indeed, there are those who say that only the embarrassment that Berlusconi's tactics and criminal indictments caused to Italians who were in touch with international opinion—and not the superior tactics or greater appeal of the Olive Tree—sufficed to tip the scales against Berlusconi at last.

France has also been characterized in recent years by a right-wing party, the Popular Movement Union, which is stronger than its main opponent on the left, the Socialist Party. But the constitutional possibility of “cohabitation” between a prime minister of one party and a president coming from the other has kept the two in closer balance than were the Italian left and right during the reign of Berlusconi. Furthermore, both sides suffer from continuous fragmentation, never more damning than when the Socialists lost the presidency in 2002 simply because they were so unable to make common cause with their putative allies on the left that they allowed extreme-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen to supplant their own candidate, Lionel Jospin, in the runoff. And this leads to a key point that Haegel and Lazar insist upon: that we must recognize that the kind of prosperity winnable by minority “antisystem” parties is very different from that of the major parties, but may, in certain circumstances, be no less significant for the direction that national politics will take.

The final chapter in Part 3 is, like the nation and the parties it studies, sui generis, dedicated as it is by Kolodny to analyzing why the Republican and Democratic Parties of the United States are the only US parties capable of attaining national power. The answer is both crystal-clear and largely unknown: it is the laws of the realm—of all fifty states as well as of the nation—that have so secured the duopoly of the monoliths. Can it ever be broken? And if so, what will be required to break it? Kolodny has taken the trouble to find out.

This rich and fascinating array of parties, and perspectives on what makes them prosperous, leaves us with far more than we could say in a single concluding chapter. Peter H. Merkl has chosen in Chapter 17 to concentrate on what we can deduce about how a party may become a party of government. Drawing from both his knowledge of other nations' politics and the cases discussed in this book, he considers the particular significance of coalitions, powerful minority parties, the reputation of being “a natural party of government,” and successive autocracy and/or a meltdown of the preceding party system. On the whole, Merkl finds that today's parties serve the existing democracies as well as one can reasonably expect.

Kay Lawson is less sanguine. In Chapter 18 she suggests that parties all too frequently serve as agencies of dedemocratization. She lists four means that parties consistently employ to achieve lasting prosperity for themselves and their supporters—strengthening party leaders and central authority, policy centrism, self-protection by legal means against the possibility of meaningful opposition,

and outright corruption—and finds multiple examples of each throughout the chapters of this book. These practices, she argues, weaken and eventually remove the direct linkage between an active democratic citizenry and its government that parties are expected to provide, contributing to the growing autonomy of the rulers from the ruled. Which is to say: they dedemocratize.

PART 1

Parties on the Left

13

Chile: From Individual Politics to Party Militancy

ALFREDO JOIGNANT AND PATRICIO NAVIA

A party that goes from winning 9.8 percent of the vote in a parliamentary election in 1989 to 25.2 percent in 2001 and 22.3 percent in 2005 can be safely considered a prosperous party. However, when that party achieves such expansion despite its strong public adherence to the unpopular legacy of a military dictatorship, the prosperity of the party worries those concerned with democratic consolidation. In this chapter we discuss the rapid electoral growth of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in Chile. We describe its electoral strengths and analyze the homogeneity of its leadership and parliamentary delegation.

Historical Background

Historically, the Chilean party system comprised five to six strong parties aligned on a right-left continuum, with two parties catering to the conservative electorate. The Conservative and Liberal Parties firmly held control of the conservative vote until 1964, when they abstained from having their own presidential candidate and instead chose to support Eduardo Frei Montalva, leader of the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC). That choice came in response to concern over the electoral strength of Socialist candidate Salvador Allende. In the end, Frei won a sweeping victory, but did not bring right-wing parties into his government cabinet. In the 1965 parliamentary election, the PDC won a large plurality of votes, while the Conservative and Liberal Parties lost most of their seats in both chambers. That electoral defeat forced both parties to merge into a single unified conservative party, the National Party (PN), in 1967. With the election of Allende as president in 1970, the PN actively led the opposition, forming an alliance with the PDC.¹ When the military overthrew Allende in 1973, many PN leaders and militants joined the new government as ministers, advisers, ambassadors, or local government officials,

and the party was officially dissolved. During the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (1973–1990), political parties were made illegal.² The dictatorship actively prosecuted leftist parties, but tolerated the existence of the centrist PDC. The PN, however, did not make an effort to regroup after the coup, creating an opportunity for new conservative political movements to emerge.

The dictatorship sought to create a new political order free of the threat of communism. A new constitution, approved in a controversial plebiscite in 1980, became effective in 1981, when General Pinochet was inaugurated for an eight-year presidential term. Although limited political party activity was allowed for in the new constitution, transitional articles delayed the adoption of the appropriate laws that would regulate party activity.³

The 1982 economic crisis hit Chile severely, bringing unemployment close to 30 percent and causing a recession that shrank the economy by 14.2 percent (Constable and Valenzuela 1991, p. 185). Popular discontent with the regime skyrocketed, and protests and strikes became daily occurrences. The PDC openly joined the opposition and led the formation of a wide front of opposition parties. Although the ban on political parties was formally lifted in 1987, the protests that erupted in 1982 forced the dictatorship to hold talks with opposition political parties. Together with the PDC, leaders from the Socialist and Radical Parties formed a unified front that would later evolve into the Concertación.

With political party activity openly flourishing among opponents to the regime, its supporters resurrected the old PN and created new groups to defend the ideological vision of the dictatorship. This is the context in which the UDI was created. Officially founded as a group in 1983, the UDI's roots can be traced to the mid-1960s, when a group of students from the Catholic University of Chile became politically active. The *gremialistas*, headed by law student Jaime Guzmán, promoted conservative Catholic values, authoritarian order, and traditional principles. Vehemently opposed to the reformist PDC and having staunch anticommunist stances, *gremialistas* were correctly identified as sympathizers with the Francisco Franco regime in Spain, and with the most conservative wing of the PN.

Many *gremialista* leaders joined the military dictatorship after 1973 (Huneaus 2001; Cristi 2000). The *gremialistas* continued to operate as a homogeneous group and exerted strong influence in the writing of the 1980 constitution. In addition, *gremialistas* took control of the government's Youth Secretariat and filled many appointed posts as local mayors and provincial governors. These appointments became very important in terms of electoral gains in the 1990s, and partially explain the successful political consolidation and electoral growth of the UDI during the 1990s.

When political parties reemerged, the *gremialistas* eventually formed the UDI as a group of Pinochet loyalists who sought to build support for the dictatorship in urban shantytowns and who aspired to build a new conservative

party. The UDI did not become a formal political party until 1987. That year, the UDI joined other conservative groups to form National Renewal (RN). Taking advantage of the political opening forced on the government by the democratic opposition, the RN began the legal process to acquire official recognition as a political party.

The joint effort undertaken by all major conservative groups led many to believe that the past history of fragmentation of the conservative forces would be overcome. However, the life of the united conservative party did not last long. In mid-1988, as a result of a political quarrel to control the party, some UDI leaders were expelled from the RN for rampeting with internal party elections. The entire faction abandoned the RN and formed a new party, the UDI. The UDI sought to differentiate itself from the RN by strongly campaigning for Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite. Although it also endorsed Pinochet, the RN had preferred a "consensus" conservative candidate other than Pinochet. The UDI positioned itself as the dictatorship-loyalist party.⁴

After supporting Pinochet's losing bid in the 1988 plebiscite, the UDI opposed the efforts championed by the democratic opposition to reform the 1980 constitution. A coalition of centrist and leftist parties, most notably the Christian Democratic Party, the Socialist Party (PS), and the Party for Democracy (PPD), known as the Concertación, won the presidential election in 1989 and achieved majority control of the Chamber of Deputies and among the elected members of the Senate. With the support of appointed senators, the conservative opposition—comprising the UDI and the RN—gained control of the Senate and, because of appointments made by the outgoing dictatorship, retained control of most municipal governments.

From 1988 to 2005, the Concertación won all presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elections. Yet because of appointed senators (abolished in 2005) and a number of deadlock provisions in the 1980 constitution, up until 1997 the conservative coalition (Alianza) had more power over the political system than its poor electoral performance would have suggested. In 1999 the Alianza came barely short of defeating the Concertación in a very competitive presidential election. A mere nine years after the Pinochet dictatorship ended, the UDI had positioned itself as a credible political alternative to the Concertación government. Even though the UDI suffered a setback in 2005 as its presidential candidate finished third in the presidential race, the party managed to maintain the largest delegation in Congress.

First Explanations for Success

How has the UDI been able to achieve such success? Several factors contributed to its rise: changes in electoral law, changes in the strategies and the electoral appeal of its competition (from other parties of the right as well as from the left), and the evolution of a growing gender gap.

Changes in Electoral Law

After the 1988 plebiscite, several reforms were approved to make the 1980 constitution more democratic, among them new electoral rules for the Senate (with thirty-eight elected and nine appointed members) and the Chamber of Deputies. The chamber comprised sixty districts of two seats each, while the Senate comprised nineteen districts of two seats each.⁵ The "binominal" system makes it very difficult for any party to clinch both seats in any district. To secure one seat, a party needs to obtain a one-third share of the vote, plus one. To secure both seats, a party needs to obtain twice as many votes as the runner-up. The system was designed to overrepresent the forces loyal to Pinochet, but it also helps parties divert from the hypothetical median voter, because one can "buy" 50 percent of the seats in every district with one-third of the votes. In addition, parties had incentives to form electoral alliances and maximize their chances of passing the one-third vote threshold that would guarantee one of the two seats in every district. When the Concertación worked out an electoral coalition, right-wing parties were forced to do so as well (coalescing into the Alianza).

Changes in Electoral Competition

Having won all elections held since 1989, the Concertación is the most successful electoral coalition in the country's history. The conservative opposition, on the other hand, experienced difficulties as it tried to overcome Pinochet's 1988 electoral defeat and its authoritarian legacy. The Alianza first had a chance to contest the Concertación's hegemonic rule in 1997. That year, the Concertación obtained barely over 50 percent of the vote. Although the Alianza obtained only 36.3 percent support—well short of Pinochet's strong 44 percent in 1988—the weakness of the Concertación seemed to have awakened the conservative coalition.

Because the Concertación chose Socialist Ricardo Lagos as its candidate in 1999—signaling an ideological shift toward the left—the Alianza directed its message to moderate voters. In the first-round 1999 presidential election, the Alianza candidate, the UDI's Joaquín Lavín, obtained an impressive 47.5 percent, surpassing Pinochet's 1988 record of 44 percent. Although the Concertación candidate won the runoff election with 52 percent, the 1999 election was the first truly contested election since the 1988 plebiscite. Since the 1999 election, the Alianza has fared well. It lost by 12 percent in the 2000 municipal elections, the narrowest margin for municipal contests so far. In the 2001 parliamentary election, the Alianza obtained 44.3 percent, 3.6 percent less than the Concertación. Although the results of the 2004 municipal elections represented an electoral setback for the UDI, it has remained a prosperous party. In 2005, when the Alianza fielded two presidential candidates, the combined vote for conservatives was slightly higher (48.6 percent) than that received by Concertación's Michelle Bachelet (46.0 percent). Moreover, despite the fact that

the UDI presidential candidate ended up third, the UDI consolidated its position as the party with the most votes in the country and the most seats in Congress. Even though the Alianza lost electoral ground in 2004 and 2005, the UDI consolidated its position as the strongest right-wing party and barely lost its first place as the party most voted for in Chile.

The success of the Alianza can be directly linked to the electoral fortunes of the UDI. While the UDI took only 9.8 percent of the vote in 1989, it climbed to 14.5 percent and 25.2 percent in 1997 and 2001, respectively (see Table 13.1). In 2005, its 22.3 percent was sufficient to retain the title of the most popular party in Chile. Running in districts where it could find competitive candidates, recruiting among local leaders, and forging alliances designed to limit the influence of the RN rather than to increase its own, the UDI can be characterized as an obstructionist party until 1996. Rejecting the notion of political party militancy as a tool to foster accountability, most UDI candidates ran as independent candidates within the Alianza in the 1996 municipal elections. For that reason, the UDI fell from 10.2 percent of the vote in 1992 to 3.4 percent in 1996. Notably, Joaquín Lavín, one of the UDI's best-known mayors seeking reelection, chose to run under the party label in 1996 in the wealthy municipality of Las Condes. Lavín won reelection with 77.6 percent. His 86,000 votes accounted for 40 percent of all UDI official votes that year. His electoral victory and his loyalty to the party allowed him to easily become the party's presidential hopeful in 1999.

In the 1997 parliamentary election, the UDI obtained 14.5 percent of the vote and elected five senators (plus four independent conservative senators and four of the nine appointed senators). That helped consolidate the UDI over the RN as the leading conservative party. Counting both elected and appointed senators, the Alianza held a majority of twenty-four to twenty-two seats in the Senate (twenty to eighteen in favor of the Concertación among elected senators). The UDI had the support of fourteen of the twenty-four conservative senators (the RN had the remaining ten). Thus, despite having lower levels of electoral support than the RN, the UDI still had more political clout than its coalition partners.

The retirement of General Pinochet from the army in 1998 and his entry into the Senate as a lifetime member made it difficult for conservative parties to leave the authoritarian legacy behind. But Pinochet's arrest in London in October 1998 eventually helped the UDI. Although the UDI expressed outrage at Pinochet's arrest and demanded decisive government action to ensure Pinochet's return to Chile, the arrest of the aging dictator may have been a blessing in disguise for the party, which took pride in identifying with the Pinochet legacy. UDI presidential candidate Lavín surprised many when he declared that he thought Pinochet should be tried in Chile for human rights abuses committed during his seventeen-year dictatorship. The UDI successfully presented itself as defending Pinochet's legacy rather than Pinochet himself. That distinction

Table 13.1 Electoral Results in Chile, Selected Parties and Coalitions, 1988–2005

	Independent Democratic Union		Alianza		Concertación		Total Valid Votes
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Votes	Percentage	
Nonpresidential elections							
1988 (plebiscite)	0	0.0	3,114,923	44.0	3,963,088	56.0	7,078,011
1989 (Chamber of Deputies)	667,369	9.8	2,323,581	34.2	3,499,713	51.5	6,797,122
1992 (municipal)	652,954	10.2	1,901,815	29.7	3,417,154	53.3	6,410,906
1993 (Chamber of Deputies)	816,104	12.1	2,471,789	36.7	3,733,276	55.4	6,738,859
1996 (municipal)	211,840	3.4	2,046,001	32.5	3,536,842	56.1	6,301,298
1997 (Chamber of Deputies)	837,736	14.5	2,101,392	36.3	2,927,692	50.5	5,795,773
2000 (municipal)	1,040,349	16.0	2,612,307	40.1	3,396,274	52.1	6,515,574
2001 (Chamber of Deputies)	1,538,835	25.2	2,703,701	44.3	2,925,800	47.9	6,107,140
2004 (municipal)	1,096,341	18.8	2,197,847	37.7	2,795,839	47.9	5,835,031
2005 (Chamber of Deputies)	1,456,430	22.3	2,522,558	38.7	3,374,865	51.8	6,518,001
Presidential elections							
1989	2,052,116	29.4	2,052,116	29.4	3,850,571	55.2	6,979,859
1993	1,701,324	24.4	2,132,274	30.6	4,040,497	58.0	6,968,950
1999	3,352,199	47.5	3,352,199	47.5	3,383,339	48.0	7,055,128
2005	1,601,169	23.2	3,353,035	48.6	3,167,939	45.6	6,893,583

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

allowed Lavín to call for Pinochet's trial in Chile while at the same time arguing against significant changes to the constitutional framework left in place by Pinochet. Although Lavín did attempt to court moderate voters with proposals long advocated by the Concertación, the UDI's presidential success emanates from Lavín's strategy to separate Pinochet's fate from the structure devised by the dictatorship that sought to establish a model of protected democracy in the country.

From 1989 to 1999, the UDI always managed to impose its presidential candidate on the RN, the larger coalition partner. In 2005, however, the UDI was unable to do just that. Former senator and wealthy businessman Sebastián Piñera entered the race as the RN candidate, thus splitting the Alianza into two camps. Even though the conservative coalition agreed to a unified slate of candidates for parliament, the split in the presidential election proved costly to the UDI. Piñera edged Lavín by a 25.4 percent to 23.2 percent margin in the first round. In the runoff, Piñera lost against Bachelet (by a vote of 46.5 percent to 53.5 percent).

We do not seek here to explain all political developments in Chile,⁶ but to outline what lies behind the electoral success of the UDI. We have constructed two general hypotheses focusing on the relationship of the party to its competition. First, some have claimed that the UDI is becoming the hegemonic party within the right simply by capturing the electoral support previously enjoyed by independents and the RN. While Pinochet obtained 44 percent of the vote in the 1988 plebiscite (out of 7.1 million voters), in the most recent Chamber of Deputies elections in December of 2001 and 2005, conservative parties obtained 44.3 percent and 38.7 percent of the vote respectively. Even the strong electoral performance of Lavín in 1999 barely surpassed the vote obtained by Pinochet in 1988. And in 2005, the two conservative presidential candidates combined to obtain 48.6 percent of the vote (3.3 million voters), just slightly over what Lavín had received alone in 1999. According to this view, the growth of the UDI has come at the expense of the RN and other conservative candidates.

The other hypothesis stressing the role of the competition links the electoral growth of the UDI to a fall in the support for the Concertación. After safely obtaining a majority in all elections until 1996, the Concertación has wavered around 50 percent since 1997. This fall in electoral support, and most specifically the fall in support for the PDC, certainly helps to explain the UDI's electoral prosperity. The absence of a PDC presidential candidate in 1999 (when Socialist candidate Ricardo Lagos defeated PDC candidate Andrés Zaldívar in the primaries to become the Concertación's presidential candidate) and in 2005 (when Socialist candidate Michelle Bachelet secured the coalition nomination due to her popularity in preelectoral polls) tilted the decision of many centrist voters in favor of the UDI candidate. And after casting votes for the UDI in 1999, they continued voting for that party in the 2000 and 2004


municipal elections, the 2001 parliamentary contest, and the 2005 presidential election.

The two hypotheses need not be mutually exclusive. On the one hand, the UDI could successfully position itself as the largest conservative party and attract the support of conservative voters who previously cast votes for the RN. On the other, the UDI might have also made gains among voters who previously cast votes for the Concertación, especially for the PDC. We claim that, in fact, both things happened concurrently after 1996 and especially starting with the 1999 presidential election. We underline how the UDI came to gain majority control of the electoral support of conservative voters and how it made inroads among centrist Concertación voters. We highlight in particular how the UDI has increased its support among women, restoring a pattern observed before 1973, when women voted overwhelmingly for conservative, particularly PDC, candidates. By targeting women voters, the UDI has lived up to its stated objective of replacing the PDC as the most important centrist and Catholic party in Chilean politics.

Figure 13.1 shows evidence that is consistent with both hypotheses. The UDI has advanced over the years from capturing about one-third of the Alianza's vote in 1989 to more than half of the total conservative vote in 2005. Yet the total conservative vote was lower in percentage and smaller in number in 2005 than in the 1988 plebiscite. With the exception of the 1999 presidential election (not shown here), the conservative parties have not successfully obtained more votes than Pinochet did in 1988. The growth of the UDI comes, to a large extent, at the expense of RN and independent conservative candidates. Overall, the Alianza has grown little compared to its 1988 peak, although it has grown significantly compared to its 1992 low, but the UDI has successfully captured the bulk of the conservative vote.

The growth of the UDI vote has occurred concurrently with a slight but definite decline of the Concertación, particularly of the PDC. Having reached its peak in 1992, the PDC has seen its share of the vote decline in every parliamentary and municipal election since (although the party experienced a much celebrated but marginal comeback in 2004 and 2005). Because PDC votes have fallen at a faster rate than the overall Concertación vote, most analysts have correctly concluded that a number of former PDC sympathizers are now voting for other Concertación parties. But because the overall Concertación vote has fallen, and the vote for the left has not grown, most analysts suggest that the PDC has lost votes to the Alianza as well.

Because overall electoral participation has declined—more people cast valid votes in the 1988 plebiscite than in any election since, despite a 28 percent increase in the number of eligible voters in the 1988–2005 period—the absolute numbers of votes going to the Concertación and Alianza have also declined over time. While almost 4 million people voted against Pinochet in 1988 (and 3.1 million voted yes in the plebiscite), only 3.4 and 2.5 million



voted for the Concertación and the Alianza in 2005, respectively. Several analysts have argued that the Alianza, and particularly the UDI, have made little real inroads in winning over Concertación (and specifically PDC) support. If anything, they argue, Alianza voters have abstained at lower rates than the rest of the population, and this is what explains the Alianza's renewed electoral strength.

The Growing Gender Gap

Table 13.2 shows the behavior of women voters. Because men and women vote at different precincts, and votes are tallied separately, gender-specific results are readily available. While the UDI went from 9.8 percent to 22.3 percent in its national share of the vote from 1989 to 2005, Lavín's party did much better among women voters. With 10.8 percent of the women's vote in 1989 and 23.6 percent in 2005, the UDI has always obtained a higher percentage of votes among women than among men. Overall, women regularly cast about 56 percent of UDI votes. Because there are more women voters than men, about 53 percent of all votes are women's. Yet the UDI is the only party to consistently obtain higher levels of support among women than among men. That trend of larger conservative support among women than men was also present before 1973. Salvador Allende obtained 36.1 percent of the vote in the 1970 presidential election, edging out conservative Jorge Alessandri by a

Table 13.2 Women's Voting Behavior in Chile: The UDI and the Alianza, 1989–2005

	Independent Democratic Union		Alianza		Percentage of UDI Votes Cast by Women	Percentage of Alianza Votes Cast by Women	Percentage of Total Votes Cast by Women
	Women Voting UDI	Percentage of Women's Vote	Women Voting Alianza	Percentage of Women's Vote			
Nonpresidential elections							
1989 (Chamber of Deputies)	383,964	10.8	1,312,233	37.0	57.5	56.5	52.1
1992 (municipal)	364,478	10.9	1,047,917	10.2	55.8	55.1	52.3
1993 (Chamber of Deputies)	458,351	12.9	1,357,075	38.3	56.1	54.9	52.5
1996 (municipal)	112,030	4.3	872,766	33.4	52.9	55.3	53.2
1997 (Chamber of Deputies)	479,369	15.5	1,118,553	38.1	57.2	56.3	53.5
2000 (municipal)	583,368	16.8	1,439,422	41.6	56.1	55.1	53.3
2001 (Chamber of Deputies)	872,154	26.6	1,517,409	46.4	56.7	56.1	53.6
2004 (municipal)	604,313	19.5	1,205,328	38.8	55.1	54.8	53.2
2005 (Chamber of Deputies)	824,421	23.6	1,400,510	40.1	56.7	55.5	52.2
Presidential elections							
1989	—	—	1,181,565	32.5	—	57.6	52.0
1993	—	—	949,407	26.0	—	55.9	52.4
1999	—	—	1,883,621	50.6	—	56.2	52.8
2005	913,345	24.9	1,799,578	49.0	57.0	54.0	53.3

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

1.1 percent margin. However, Allende widely defeated Alessandri by a 41.5 to 31.7 percent margin among men voters, and lost decisively by 38.6 to 30.5 percent among women.

In 1988, Pinochet lost much more narrowly among women (49.7 to 50.3 percent) than among men (52.5 to 47.5 percent). In the 1989 presidential election, the gender gap decreased as Patricio Aylwin, of the Concertación, captured 51.6 percent of the women's vote and 55.2 percent of the total vote. In 1993 the gender gap almost vanished, with Concertación's Eduardo Frei capturing 58.0 percent of the overall vote and 57.5 percent of the women's. Yet when in 1999 the Concertación's candidate was no longer a PDC but a Socialist, the gender gap reemerged. The Alianza's Lavín obtained 50.6 percent of the women's vote in the first round, safely defeating the Concertación's Lagos, who obtained only 45.4 percent of the women's vote. In the runoff, Lavín once again did slightly better than Lagos among women, but lost so decisively among men that Lagos went on to win the presidency. The gender gap appeared again in the 2001 parliamentary election, when the Concertación obtained 49.1 percent among men and 46.9 percent among women. The Alianza obtained 41.9 percent and 46.4 percent, respectively. Although the gap was lower than in 1999, it was sufficiently large to have altered the distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies.⁷

However, in 2005 the Concertación did much better among women. Michelle Bachelet obtained 44.8 percent of the male vote and 47 percent of the female vote. Conservative candidates, however, also did better among women than among men (with the Communist candidate doing much better among men than among women). Thus, even though the Concertación did make inroads among women voters by having a woman presidential candidate, conservative candidates continued to have stronger support among women than among men. In the runoff election, where communist voters threw their support behind Bachelet, she obtained a slightly higher share of the votes among men than among women. However, the UDI candidate also did well among women. In the first-round vote, Joaquín Lavín (23.2 percent) placed third, behind Sebastián Piñera (25.4 percent). But among women voters, Lavín (24.9 percent) placed second, ahead of Piñera (24.1 percent). Lavín failed to pass on the runoff, but he did place second among women voters.

* * *

Although the UDI has experienced electoral growth since 1990, and although there is some evidence to suggest it is making gains among segments of the population that previously voted for the PDC (as in the case of women), we have not yet discussed the underlying reasons that can account for this electoral phenomenon. An analysis of the UDI's parliamentary delegation and candidates is needed to shed light on the social properties and political attributes of its members. It is ultimately the appeal of individual candidates—however

closely they might be associated with a given political party and in some cases precisely because they are associated with it—that explains electoral support. In understanding what makes the UDI parliamentary delegation different from that of other parties, we seek to identify potential explanatory causes for the UDI's recent electoral success.

The Political, Social, and Cultural Conditions of UDI Success

Since 1990, despite being a relatively new party, the UDI has successfully built an objectified capital that goes beyond its immediate material expressions (party local offices) and symbolic expressions (flags, traditions). Although a good number of UDI legislators entered the party with baggage acquired outside the organization (profitable professions, names linked to traditional and prestigious families, extended social networks built by family relations and by homogeneous educational and religious background), the growing party political capital, permitting the party to influence its members rather than the other way around, now undermines and subordinates the individual assets of its members, whose value and sense of belonging depend ultimately on an organization that distributes and gives value to them. It is in fact the extraordinarily homogeneous individual resources and assets that its members have brought to the party that have made the UDI a disciplined and orderly political force. UDI legislators can present a caricaturized image of "just one man," because of a common political and cultural identity that antecedes the organization itself: a predominance of Catholic schooling among its legislators, attendance at Catholic universities, a strong generational homogeneity, and, consequently, similar political experiences. Limited professional pluralism, similar tools and training, and strong experience as local government appointees during the dictatorship, particularly as mayors.

Together with analyzing the party's electoral evolution, one needs to consider the social properties and characteristics of its leadership, overwhelmingly composed of senators and deputies.⁸ Although UDI benefits from the hard local work carried out since the 1980s by its leaders, whose objective has been to induce a "vertical cut" in society aimed at ending the "old understanding that identified the wealthy with the right and the poor with the left."⁹ It is impossible not to identify a vicious-virtuous circle composed of nondemocratic (vicious) resources and social (virtuous) properties that makes the UDI legislative delegation an exceptionally homogeneous group. Insofar as nondemocratic tools are concerned, we must correctly measure the return of the political resources available to UDI leaders at the beginning of the transition period: intensive use of territorial positions occupied during the dictatorship, such as appointed mayors, governors, and deputy regional ministers;¹⁰ use of malapportioned electoral districts; and effective use of the binomial electoral

system, which has allowed conservatives to win 50 percent of the seats with just one-third of the votes in a district. Yet it is also important to explain the party's social characteristics during the early stages of its transformation, reconstructing the social-political relations that have made possible its transformation and played so important a role in its success.

We compiled biographical data on the forty-two UDI deputies elected from 1989 to 2001 (four four-year parliamentary periods), based on data from the National Congress Library, UDI data, and data from reports in Chilean newspapers (*El Mercurio* and *La Tercera*). We also conducted a similar study for deputies from the five other largest parties for the period from 1989 to 1997. In sum, our sample comprises forty-two UDI deputies, fifty RN deputies (not including three new deputies who were elected in 2001), seventy-one PDC deputies (not including six elected in 2001), twenty-seven PPD deputies (not including eight new deputies), twenty-one PS deputies (excluding three most recently elected), and eight deputies of the Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD) (excluding five new deputies).


Catholic Socialization in Schools and Universities

Although the UDI is not a confessional party, there is a strong predominance of Catholic educational background among UDI legislators. Over 73 percent of UDI deputies attended Catholic schools, and two Catholic institutions account for one-third of all educational institutions attended. UDI deputies attended Catholic schools more so than the deputies from the conservative RN and PDC. Although part of the reason might be that many PDC deputies come from lower- and middle-class families—and therefore could not afford private Catholic education—the marked homogeneity in the Catholic schooling of UDI deputies is no accident. Wealthy families are more likely to send their children to private schools, but that does not necessarily imply Catholic schools.

Taking into account the historical importance of universities as avenues of political socialization, one cannot help but establish a connection between attending Catholic schools (see Figure 13.2) and universities (see Figure 13.3) and the likelihood of becoming a militant of the UDI, especially attending the Pontifical Catholic University (PUC): 31 percent of all UDI deputies attended the PUC, and an additional 7 percent attended other Catholic universities. In addition, as discussed, the UDI origins can be intellectually traced back to the *gremialismo* movement in the 1960s, precisely within the PUC.


There seems to be an important cohesive function of UDI religious values, which, paraphrasing Jon Elster (1989), work as "cement" in the UDI, to the point of becoming a *Weltanschauung*. That moral and value cement, which allows UDI members to recognize each other as equal or at least as equivalent, explains the need to contrast the cultural homogeneity of this party with the greater heterogeneity observed in other parties, particularly the PDC. That is what we attempt with the index of cultural homogeneity of the UDI parliamen-

Figure 13.2 Religious Affiliation in Chile, by Political Party Delegation, Chamber of Deputies, 1990–2002



Source: Compiled by authors from official legislators' biographies and other press sources.
 Notes: Party religious affiliations sum to more than 100 percent because deputies who attended both Catholic and non-Catholic (public) schools are counted twice; the category "Other" includes foreign and private nonconfessional schools. Legislative elections in Chile are held in December, but newly elected officials start their jobs three months later, in March.

Figure 13.3 University Affiliation in Chile, by Political Party Parliamentary Delegation, Chamber of Deputies, 1990–2002



Source: Compiled by authors from official legislators' biographies and other press sources.

ary delegation. The contrast between the UDI and its competitors, the RN¹¹ and the PDC, is striking, as shown in Table 13.3.

This index includes three attributes: (1) attending Catholic elementary or secondary schools, (2) attending Catholic universities, and (3) having served as president or vice president at the national, regional, or local level of the party before being elected deputy. In 1990, half of the UDI deputies possessed at least two attributes, more than twice as many as RN deputies and almost twice as many as PDC deputies. By 1998, only 34 percent of UDI deputies scored at least two attributes, slightly more than the RN (28.6 percent) and the PDC (22.5 percent). There is a considerable homogeneity over time. If we restrict the index to only the first two attributes, we find that only 7.1 percent of UDI deputies did not go through the Catholic school system in 1990. Because a high proportion (one-third) of those who attended Catholic schools went primarily to two different educational institutions, the homogeneity is even more striking.

This type of cultural integration explains a good deal of what many analysts have referred to as the UDI parliamentary "discipline." It is really a moral-based community. Yet the importance of a common schooling and university background does not explain everything. There is an important generational component as well (see Table 13.4).

From Moral to Political Community

We can identify two UDI generations of deputies. Although classifying political actors by age just by virtue of a biological association might be misleading—

Table 13.3 Cultural Homogeneity in Chile: UDI, RN, and PDC Deputies, 1990–2002 (percentages)

Parliamentary Period	Political Party	Attributes			
		0	1	2	3
1990–1994	UDI	7.1	42.9	42.9	7.1
	RN	23.3	53.3	20.0	3.3
	PDC	7.9	57.9	23.7	10.5
1994–1998	UDI	17.6	41.2	35.3	11.8
	RN	22.2	47.2	27.8	2.8
	PDC	11.3	54.7	24.5	9.4
1998–2002	UDI	19.2	34.6	34.6	11.5
	RN	21.4	45.2	28.6	2.4
	PDC	12.7	53.5	22.5	9.9

Source: Compiled by authors from official legislators' biographies and other press sources.
 Notes: Attribute 1 = percentage who attended Catholic elementary or secondary schools; Attribute 2 = percentage who attended Catholic universities; Attribute 3 = percentage who served as president or vice president at the national, regional, or local level of the party before being elected deputy.

Table 13.4 Institutional Resources Available for Electoral Use in Chile: UDI Deputies and Senators, 1990–2006 (percentages)


Period	Attributes			
	UDI Office	0	1	2
1990–1994	Deputies	—	64.3	35.7
	Senators	—	50.0	50.0
	Deputies	11.8	64.7	29.4
1994–1998	Deputies	20.0	60.0	20.0
	Senators	23.2	61.5	19.2
	Deputies	50.0	40.0	10.0
2002–2006	Deputies	33.3	57.1	11.9
	Senators	46.2	38.5	15.4

Source: Compiled by authors from official legislators' biographies and other press sources. Notes: Attribute 1 = percentage who held positions in business (*gerenciales*) and trade organizations. Attribute 2 = percentage who were appointed mayors by the dictatorship.

especially if we refer to certain “time period effects”¹²—it is pertinent to utilize this index here because there are certain common political experiences that render that distinction relevant. Just over half (52 percent) of all UDI deputies were born between 1950 and 1959 (see Figure 13.4). That generation experienced the historical transition, in the context of university student movements, from a polarized democracy in which the PDC and the left led the movement to a political authoritarian order that eventually became institutionalized during the dictatorship. The parliamentary delegations of the other parties are on average ten years older, which means that their first political experiences and the genesis of their political competence (Joignant 2004; Gaxie 2002) correspond to a historical order whose biographical impact came before that of the UDI deputies.

The second generation of UDI deputies is marked less by its youth than by a community of political experiences characterized by the struggles around the transition to democracy of the late 1980s and the “pragmatic” preservation of an ever more distant direct association with the authoritarian legacy. Thus, 21 percent of UDI deputies born in the 1960s entered politics in the context of a declining military dictatorship or with the UDI already in the opposition. Together, the two generations represent two-thirds of the UDI deputies, significantly higher than the other parties and distinct enough to feed the public discourse of rejection of “old-style politics” and promotion of “modern” approaches. This political community, funded on homologous biographical experiences, does not prevent the emergence of different ways of entering professional politics (see Table 13.5). Even though there is overwhelming evidence of utilization of public sector positions and appointed political posts to gain electoral advantages by the time first-generation UDI deputies were elected in 1989, that trend falls progressively over time as independents and

Figure 13.4 Birth Years in Chile, by Political Party Parliamentary Delegation, Chamber of Deputies, 1990–2002



Source: Compiled by authors from official legislators' biographies and other press sources; not all figures available.

Table 13.5 Electoral Competency in Chile: UDI Deputies and Senators, 1990–2010 (percentages)

UDI Office and Period	Attributes			
	0	1	2	3
Deputies 1990–1994	—	35.7	64.3	—
Senators 1990–1998	—	—	100.0	—
Deputies 1994–1998	5.9	47.1	52.9	—
Senators 1994–2002	—	40.0	60.0	—
Deputies 1998–2002	11.5	46.2	42.3	—
Senators 1998–2006	20.0	40.0	40.0	—
Deputies 2002–2006	21.4	40.5	38.1	—
Senators 2002–2010	23.1	30.8	38.5	7.7

Source: Compiled by authors from official legislators' biographies and other press sources. Notes: Attribute 1 = percentage who had business and trade associations before being elected. Attribute 2 = percentage who held government-appointed posts (as mayors, governors, and/or regional governors) before being elected.

younger candidates find their way to the party lists with credible chances of winning office (11 percent in 1993, 23 percent in 1997, and 33 percent in 2001). The later generations came to power under the influence of, and guided by, a different set of socializing experiences.

The evidence should not obscure the dynamics that antecede an electoral contest. In fact, if we take as constitutive elements of an electoral competence those variables that help one build a political machine and amass a sufficiently large electoral war chest of money, resources, and connections, the tools at hand for UDI deputies and senators are also striking (see Table 13.6). Table 13.5 includes all territorial positions and party leadership positions held by an individual, assuming that access to those positions is evidence of constitutive knowledge of an acquired electoral competency in three institutional areas that make them better prepared to face an election. UDI deputies have a type of preelectoral competency that amply transcends the mere experience of being an appointed mayor, since at least two-thirds of them had two or more attributes. Certainly, as time progresses and the importance of independent deputies who lacked these attributes grows—although it is still small—the trend of candidates with access to resources and constitutive preelectoral experiences (which are naturally updated at the time of running in an election) remains. The importance of this preelectoral competency is confirmed even if we eliminate the attribute of occupying territorial positions during the dictatorship, with the objective of singling out the properties of the agents who won a Chamber of Deputies seat in 2001, that is, only among those who could only benefit from leadership experiences in business and trade associations and in the political party. Those attributes are present in more than half the deputies.¹³

Table 13.6 Electoral Competency in Chile: UDI vs. RN Deputies, 1990–2006 (percentages)

Period	Attributes			
	Political Party	0	1	2
1990–1994	UDI	35.7	42.9	21.4
	RN	40.0	53.3	6.7
1994–1998	UDI	47.1	41.2	17.6
	RN	41.7	52.8	5.6
1998–2002	UDI	46.2	38.5	19.2
	RN	35.7	59.5	4.8
2002–2006	UDI	42.9	33.3	23.8
	RN	n/a	n/a	n/a

Source: Compiled by authors from official legislators' biographies and other press sources.

Notes: Attribute 1 = percentage who had business and trade associations before being elected. Attribute 2 = percentage who held party positions before being elected.

n/a = data not available.

The comparison with RN deputies is telling, because even though both groups tend on average to go toward equilibrium, UDI deputies present three times as many attributes that make up this preelectoral competency index, regardless of the parliamentary period.

In synthesis, UDI deputies have possessed a solid level of competency before they face an election. This does not contradict the well-established trend of incorporating a broad number of independent candidates into the party list. In that sense, the characteristic UDI attribute, in its public discourse as much as in its socialization tools for its leadership recruits, consistent with efficiently performing functions that articulate corporate interests in student, professional, or business interest areas, can also be understood as a mass identity and competence principle capable of rivaling the traditions of social mobilization in the parties of the left (see Table 13.7).

The corollary of the competencies involved in the socialization experiences of the UDI parliamentary delegation is expressed in the increasingly objectified form of the party whose existence is imposed on its members. In that sense, an approximate indicator of the importance and objectification of the trademark and the organization may be derived from the number of deputies who, before being elected, occupied individual party positions at different territorial levels. As Table 13.8 shows, UDI deputies come last among parties in the ranking of individual party positions, with only 31.7 percent of deputies having previously occupied UDI leadership positions at the local level. Unlike the other parties, in which local leadership seems to be a condition for legislative political careers, legislators in the UDI do not need to start out at the grassroots level. Their political careers are sanctioned by the centralized party leadership taking into account previous political experience, but not necessarily previous service at the UDI local party level.

Table 13.7 Chilean Deputies Who Held Leadership Positions in Trade, Business, and Social Organizations Before Being Elected, 1990–2005

Party	Percentage
Christian Democratic Party	45.1
Independent Democratic Union	47.6
National Renewal	27.9
Party for Democracy	35.6
Social Democratic Radical Party	57.0
Socialist Party	47.6

Source: Compiled by authors from official legislators' biographies and other press sources.

Note: Includes leadership positions in student federations.

Table 13.8 Individual Leadership-Position Occupancy Rates at the National, Regional, Provincial, or Local Level, 1990–2005

Party	Percentage
Christian Democratic Party	77.5
Independent Democratic Union	31.7
National Renewal Party for Democracy	44.2
Radical Party	48.1
Socialist Party	71.0
	80.9

Source: Compiled by authors from official legislators' biographies and other press sources.
Note: Includes leadership positions in youth political organizations.

The 2005 Parliamentary Election

The 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections constituted a serious threat to the electoral prosperity enjoyed by the UDI since 1990. For the first time since 1993, presidential and parliamentary elections were held concurrently. Because the UDI presidential candidate, Joaquín Lavín, had lost popular appeal, the UDI feared to lose ground in its parliamentary presence as well. In addition, the emergence of a second conservative presidential candidate, the RN's Sebastián Piñera, further threatened the electoral chances of both Lavín and UDI legislators. These conditions led many to anticipate a UDI defeat that would include both Lavín and the party's parliamentary delegation. Although Lavín did go on to be the biggest loser in the election, as he was edged out by Piñera and came third, failing to qualify for the runoff, the UDI nonetheless did fairly well in the parliamentary election.

Although Piñera went on to lose against the Concertación's Michelle Bachelet, his victory over Lavín equivocally led some to believe that the UDI had also suffered an electoral defeat at the polls in the parliamentary contest. However, the electoral appeal of the UDI—though not Lavín's—proved strong enough to resist both the popularity of the Concertación's presidential candidate (Chile's first woman president) and the electoral strength shown by Sebastián Piñera. The strong cohesion of the UDI's parliamentary delegation proved sufficient to keep the UDI the most voted party in Chile. The competence of the UDI parliamentary delegation allowed the party to retain the largest share of seats in Congress. The homogeneous political socialization of the UDI legislators helped the party resist an electoral wipeout despite the dismal electoral showing of its presidential candidate.

Although the Concertación managed to obtain a comfortable electoral victory in the parliamentary election,¹⁴ the UDI did fairly well. The government coalition obtained 51.8 percent of the vote, winning 65 seats in the 120-seat

Chamber of Deputies. The Alianza obtained 38.7 percent of the vote, securing 54 seats in the chamber, a decrease of 5.6 percent in vote share and 3 seats. Because it had more votes (25.2 percent) and seats (35) than the RN in 2001, the UDI stood at a greater risk of losing seats. Although the UDI did obtain fewer votes (22.3 percent), it was able to retain most of its seats, as it went from 35 to 33 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Furthermore, as it continued to outnumber the RN in seats and votes, the UDI remained the commanding party in the Alianza.

The strong showing by the UDI is evident when analyzing the results in the districts where it defended seats. UDI deputies sought reelection in thirty-two districts, more than any other party (see Table 13.9). In twenty-seven of those districts, the UDI deputies were reelected. In five other districts, UDI deputies lost their seats. Although overall the UDI had the second largest loss of incumbent deputies, it also had the highest percentage of returning deputies among all political parties. A total of 79.4 percent of UDI elected deputies in 2005 were already serving in the Chamber of Deputies before the election. The higher success rates among other parties should not be associated with a weak showing by UDI deputies. Because the UDI had the largest parliamentary delegation, it was also the party with the most vulnerable seats. In addition, the UDI presidential candidate admittedly constituted somewhat of an electoral liability. Nonetheless, because of their sociological homogeneity, the UDI parliamentary delegation resisted what many expected to be a resounding defeat and setback for the highly ideological party.

Moreover, UDI legislators constitute the most experienced party delegation elected in 2005: 80 percent of them had already served in the Chamber of Deputies. The seven new deputies elected in 2005 who joined the UDI parliamentary delegation also exhibit, unsurprisingly, most of the same attributes discussed above for previous UDI parliamentary delegations. The objectified capital of the UDI parliamentary delegation helped the party survive an admittedly difficult electoral challenge. That delegation is where the UDI homogeneous ideological training and socialization are best expressed.

Conclusion

The growth of the UDI can be partially attributed to its ability to attract the support of conservative voters. Yet even in the midst of growing abstention levels in the electorate, the UDI has also been successful at reducing the number of dissatisfied voters and at making inroads among voters who previously preferred centrist Concertación candidates. Particularly among women, the UDI has led the Alianza effort to capture the support of centrist women voters and attain its electoral objective of replacing the PDC as the leading "centrist party." By catering primarily to centrist women voters, the UDI has achieved a position from which even greater electoral prosperity seems likely in the future.

Table 13.9 Success Rates for Chilean Deputies Seeking Reelection, 2005

Party	Number Seeking Reelection ^a	Number Defeated	Number Reelected	Success Rate (%)	Number Elected for First Time ^b	Returning Deputies (%)
Christian Democratic Party	19	7	12	63.2	9	57.1
Independent Democratic Union	32	5	27	84.4	7	79.4
National Renewal	13	2	11	76.9	9	55.0
Party for Democracy	16	1	15	100.0	7	68.2
Social Democratic Radical Party	5	0	5	100.0	2	71.4
Socialist Party	8	0	8	100.0	7	53.3
Others	—	—	—	—	1	—
Total	93	15	78	83.9	42	65.0

Source: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

Notes: a. Excludes those who switched districts.

b. Includes those who switched districts.

On the other hand, different lessons can be drawn from the social and political properties shared by the UDI parliamentary delegation. The cultural homogeneity of the UDI deputies is reflected in the behavior of many UDI leaders, a behavior marked by such conviction of righteousness as to border on intolerance. That conviction, sometimes dubbed "zealousness" and even "fanaticism," is linked to the conditions that gave birth to the party during the period when the military regime sought to deny the need for any political parties. It is certainly paradoxical that an electorally successful political party emanates from such a regime, even as its initial linkage with that regime grows weaker and weaker. The UDI constitutes an interesting expression of an objectified trademark that brings together individuals endowed with capital and vital resources, both quantitatively and qualitatively, but who at the same time join without restrictions in the formation of an objectified capital valued by everyone. Without a doubt, the indelible print left by its founding leader and the historical conditions surrounding the birth of the party explain the UDI characteristics and electoral rooting (Panebianco 1990). That framework continues to play a role several years later in the party's organizational forms and social homogeneity, which together strongly inhibit all possible expressions of dissident voices. The inhibition is not achieved within the party through the articulation of deliberate will, but through the tacit convergence of social properties and homologous experiences of its leaders. In this respect, the UDI may be termed a conservative vanguard party, a particular type of Leninist party, founded on a community of values, biographies, and competencies rather than on a coherent project developed within a globally utopian framework.

Although the UDI was able to retain most of its electoral support in 2004 and 2005, it failed to continue growing.¹⁵ The electoral strength of the Concertación raised many doubts about future electoral chances of the Alianza coalition and the UDI in particular. Joaquín Lavín sank in the election and ended in third place with a poor showing in 2005. Yet because the UDI managed to maintain its vote and seat share in the legislature, and because its parliamentary delegation continues to present a high level of discipline and strong cohesion, both in ideology and in terms of social origin, the same model that made the UDI the most successful conservative party in modern Chilean history will likely be found again. As the UDI prepares for future elections, its cohesive parliamentary delegation will constitute the basis on which the future electoral strength of the party will be built.

Notes

1. For Chilean history before 1973, see Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1976, 1986; Collier and Sater 1996; Gil 1966. For conservative parties before 1973, see Moulhan and Torres Dujisin 1988.

2. For a history of the Pinochet dictatorship, see Huneeus 2001; Cavallo, Salazar, and Sepúlveda 1997; Constable and Valenzuela 1991.

3. For a discussion of the 1980 constitution, see Barros 2002.
4. For a description of the conflicts between the UDI and the RN, see Durmuy 1999 and the analytical and semi-autobiographical Allamand 1999.
5. For a discussion of the Chilean electoral system and its countermajoritarian incentives, see Magar, Rosenblum, and Samuel's 1998; Rahat and Sznajder 1998; Savelis 1997, 2000; Savelis and Valenzuela 1997.
6. For the transition and democratic consolidation periods, see Cavallo, Salazar, and Sepúlveda 1997; Cavallo 1998; Orano 1995; Constable and Valenzuela 1991; Portales 2000; Huneus 2001; Barros 2002; Drake and Jakšic 1999.
7. For two different points of view concerning the gender gap, see Lewis 2004; Alman 2004.
8. The percentage of those holding leadership positions in the UDI (a president, five vice presidents, a general secretary, and since 1994, a prosecretary) and legislative office concurrently went from a low of 57 percent in 1989–1994 to a high of 75 percent in 1994–1998. Because of the incorporation of elected municipal mayors in the UDI leadership, that figure has fallen since 1998.
9. Alfredo Galdames (a prominent figure in the UDI's work in Santiago's popular sectors) interview, conducted by Emmanuel Falcon for a political seminar taught by Alfredo Joignant in the International Studies Institute of the University of Chile in 2001.
10. In 1989, 71.4 percent of UDI deputies had been appointed mayor during the dictatorship. In 1993, the number went down to 70.6 percent. By 2001, the number stood at 33 percent although one of the sixteen newly elected deputies had been an appointed mayor during the dictatorship. This same aspect can be found in Morales and Bugueño 2001, pp. 228, 235.
11. There seem to be two different cultural universes for the RN and the UDI delegations that served in Congress from 1989 to 2001. Although the data are inconclusive, there are more marked nationalist and traditional associative trends among RN deputies: 20.9 percent of RN legislators occupied leadership positions in country clubs and in cowboy and traditional rodeo clubs, compared to only 7.3 percent for UDI legislators.
12. On delineation of the frontiers between fluctuating categories, see Percheron 1985; Dell Carpini 1989. For analysis that relates generational logics with the socialization "surroundings," "contexts," and "networks," see Joignant 1997, pp. 541 ff.
13. Five (31 percent), aged thirty-two to thirty-five at the time of election, had their first political experiences—or at least the most explicit ones—in a historical context of transition to democracy. These are agents who could not have held territorial functions during the dictatorship.
14. Although we are only analyzing the results for the Chamber of Deputies election, the elections for half of the Senate seats also gave the Concertación a clear majority. The government coalition obtained 56.1 percent of the vote among 4.6 million voters in half of all the senatorial districts. The Alianza obtained 37.5 percent, the Communist-Humanist coalition 6 percent.
15. The lower-than-expected electoral performance of the Alianza sharply contrasts with the optimism that preceded the promulgation of the law that introduced many democratizing reforms to municipalities in Chile, as shown in Eaton 2004.

PART 3

Comparing Opposing Parties